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THE BASIS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
CHAPTER I  
In tro d u c tio n
The sad tu rm o il o f a  world which seems to  have
lo s t  a l l  sense o f d ire c t io n ,  i s  nowhere more in  evidence
than  in  the  cu rren t crop o f ph ilo soph ies  o f  education which
appear w ith a r e g u la r i ty  th a t  might appear encouraging were
i t  not fo r  th e  f a c t  th a t  they seem to  a r r iv e  a t  d iv erse
conclusions, and even a t  co n tra ry  conclusions*
A statem ent taken from one o f th e  authors o f th e  past
might w ell sum up th e  p resen t s i tu a t io n .
"What then  i s  education , and how are  we to  educate?
As y e t th e re  i s  no agreement on th ese  po in ts*  Men 
are  not agreed as to  what th e  young should le a rn  
w ith  a view e i th e r  to  p e rfe c t t r a in in g  o r to  th e  
b e s t l i f e .  I t  i s  no t agreed whether education i s  
to  aim a t  th e  development o f th e  i n t e l l e c t  o r o f 
th e  moral c h a ra c te r .  Nor i s  i t  c le a r ,  whether in  
o rder to  b ring  about these  r e s u l t s ,  we are to  t r a in  
in  what le a d s  to  v i r tu e ;  in  what i s  u se fu l fo r  the 
o rd inary  l i f e ;  o r in  a b s tra c t  s c ie n c e ." ' '
And the  statem ent "What i s  education , and how a re  we 
to  educate? As y e t th e re  i s  no agreement on th ese  p o in ts ."  
i s  even more tru e  today than  i t  was a t  the  time when A ris­
t o t l e  was e x e rtin g  h is  immense genius on the  problems which 
are  in h eren t in  a philosophy o f education . In  th e  f i r s t  
p la c e , o f  course, the  Philosopher was no t tro u b led  by an 
immense flood o f contemporary l i t e r a t u r e  on th e  su b je c t.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
P .  2
And again  he was in  th e  p o s itio n  o f a man having a complete
philosophy o f l i f e ,  and th e  fu lln e s s  o f th a t  philosophy was
fo r  him th e  b a s is  on which he b u i l t  up th e  answers to  th e
qu estio n s th a t  were posed in  th e  f i e ld  o f  education . I t
i s  not s u f f ic ie n t  to  say th a t
"The Philosopher was ab le  to  express a d e f in i te  
philosophy o f education  because he believed  th a t  
education ap p lied  to  th e  e n t i r e  p e rso n a lity , 
th a t  education meant always a way of l iv in g  th a t  
le d  to  the  achievement o f human ex c e lle n c e ." ( 2 )
because i t  i s  p re c ise ly  a t  t h i s  p o in t th a t  th e  d isp u te  be­
g in s . There i s  no one who s e ts  out to  give a  philosophy 
o f education  who does not pretend th a t  h is  system a p p lie s  
to  th e  e n t ire  p e rso n a lity ; th e  d i f f i c u l ty  and the  problems 
a r is e  when i t  comes to  th e  p o in t o f d e fin in g  what i s  meant 
by th e  p e rso n a lity . There i s  no au th o r worthy o f h is  s a l t  
who does not hold th a t  h is  philosophy o f  education lead s  
to  th e  "achievement of human e x c e l le n c e " ;  th e  p rec ise  po in t 
o f  d isp u te  a r is e s  from th e  various in te rp re ta t io n s  o f the  
r e a l i ty  o f human ex ce llen ce . The t r u th  th a t  does give a 
l ig h t  on th e  procedure o f A r is to t le  must be sought in  th e  
r e a l  m etaphysical bases o f h is  philosophy o f  education .
There i s  no room f o r  doubting th e  f a c t  th a t  a p h ilo ­
sophy o f education  i s  the a p p lic a tio n  o f a complete p h ilo ­
sophy to  the  problems th a t  a re  p resen ted  in  th e  domain o f 
education . N icholas Murray B u tle r , in  h is  In tro d u c tio n  to
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(3)h is  work "The Meaning o f Education"v /  s ta te s :
"The se rio u s  student o f  education must be a  se rio u s  
studen t o f philosophy as w e ll."
And to  quote J .  M arita in , in  the  p reface  which he has
w r itte n  to  F r. De Hovre’s "E ssa i de Philosophic Pe'dagogique"
"Le Dr. De Hovre e s t  persuade a bon d ro it  que to u te  
th e o r ie  pedagogique e s t  fondee su r un conception de 
l a  v ie ,  e t  r e s s o r t i t  par s u ite  necessairem ent a  l a  
p h i l o s o p h i e ^ '
I t  i s  t ru e  th a t  a philosophy of education  i s  founded on a 
conception o f the meaning o f  l i f e ,  and a philosophy o f  ed­
u ca tio n , founded on a meaning o f  l i f e ,  must o f  n e c e s s ity , 
i f  i t  i s  to  be a t ru e  philosophy, and no t a  mere aggrega­
tio n  of op in ions, come from a f u l l  philosophy, a formal 
philosophy, and must f u l f i l l  a l l  th e  cond itions o f a t ru e
philosophy. As Mgr. Spalding says "a complete philosophy
(5)
o f education presupposes a complete philosophy."
The aim o f t h i s  work w il l  be to  show th e  bases o f a 
philosophy of education as th ey  are found in  th e  p h ilo ­
sophy which i s  so w ell c a lle d  th e  "P hilosophia P e rre n is " , 
th e  peren n ia l philosophy. I t  i s  not a philosophy which
can be dated to  any period  of h is to ry .  I t  i s  no t a p h ilo ­
sophy which can be p red ica ted  o f any p a r t ic u la r  group o f 
men. I t  i s  a  philosophy which has been cu rren t coin  from
the days o f A r is to tle  down to  our own. I t  i s  a philosophy
which has enriched  th e  c u ltu re  o f Athens as w e ll as Oxford,
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o f  A lexandria as w ell as P a r is .  I t  may be w ell to  note 
here th a t  the  c h ie f  c r i t ic is m  d ire c te d  ag a in st philosophy 
i s  th a t  i t s  h is to ry  i s  ju s t  an e te rn a l  cycle of th e  same 
problems, always posed, and never solved. T h is, o f  course, 
i s  not a v a lid  o b je c tio n . The f a c t  th a t  i t  always poses 
th e  same problems i s  simply th e  p roof th a t  th e  problems 
are e te r n a l ,  and always p re se n t, th a t  th ey  a r e  problems 
which are  p resen ted  by th e  very  natu re  o f r e a l i ty ,  th e  
n a tu re  o f the w orld, the natu re  o f l i f e ,  and th e  n a tu re  
o f man. The ob jec tio n  which s ta te s  th a t  th ey  are  always 
posed and never solved i s  begging off th e  q u es tio n . The 
statem ent th a t  the  problems are never solved can only come 
from a person who has not understood the  s o lu tio n s , and 
perhaps has never understood th e  problem s. Dr. E. Pace, 
w i t t i l y  and perchance a t r i f l e  u n ch a ritab ly , l ik e n s  th e  
poser o f  th i s  o b jec tio n  to  the  overworked donkey, a stock 
example in  philosophy classroom , who i s  p laced e q u id is ta n t 
from two b a les  o f hay and, because he i s  a donkey, s ta rv e s  
to  death  as he cannot make up h is  mind which to  approach.
The c r i t i c  o f philosophy i s  l ik e  the donkey, he cannot make 
up h is  mind to  approach any t r u th ,  bu t Dr. Pace says th a t  
our vocal o b je c to r  i s  s ta rv in g  f o r  th e  t r u th ,  and a t  the  
same tim e he i s  try in g  to  convince th e  onlooker th a t  i f  
one bale o f hay were removed, he would cease to  be a donkey.
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The f a u l t  in  t h i s  constan t c r i t ic is m  l i e s ,  no t vdth the  
philosophy th a t  answers the  q u es tio n s , bu t w ith th e  under­
standing  and th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f th e  o b je c to r .
The t r u th  i s  th a t  t h i s  d en ia l o f philosophy and, what 
i s  as bad or w orse, a p re ju d ice  in  favour of some f a ls e  
philosophy i s  a t  the  ro o t of a l l  th e  f a i lu r e  o f th e  m u lti­
tudinous th e o r ie s  o ffe rre d  to  th e  educator o f today* I t  
i s  u se le ss  to  deny th a t  the  p re ju d ice  e x is ts  because i t  i s  
p la in ly  ev iden t in  th e  o ffe r in g s  th a t  a re  made to  th e  educat­
ing  groups by th e  proponents of many systems o f education .
As I  s a id ,  the p re ju d ice  may take one o f two form s. I t  may 
be an a n t i - in te l l e c tu a l  re a c tio n  on th e  p a r t o f those who 
do not r e a l iz e  the  in te n se  v i t a l i t y  o f th e  in te l l ig e n c e ,  
o r i t  may be what can be b es t described  as a m oral, o r per­
haps, immoral re a c t io n , on th e  p a r t  o f those who wish th e  
human in te l l ig e n c e ,  as p e rso n ified  in  them selves, to  be 
considered the  measure o f a l l  t r u th .
A b r ie f  summary of th e  p re ju d ices  found in  educational 
p r in c ip le s  th a t  a re  cu rre n t today i s  w e ll  summed up by 
J .  M arita in :
"Prejuge de c ro ire  a une psychologie s c ie n tif iq u e  
au sens p o s i t iv is te  de ee mot, c 'e s t  a d ire  au sens 
ou le s  sc iences de l a  n a tu re  c o n s ti tu e ra ie n t  I 1unique 
sc ience, a  1 ’exclusion  de to u te  metaphysique 5 des 
qu*un science a l'homme pour o b je t .  E lle  en tre  dans 
l a  ca teg o rie  des sc iences de v a le u rs ; e lim iner l a  
p e rso n a lity  avec son systems de v a le u rs , c 'e s t  n ie r  
l a  nature meme de ces departem ents du sav o ir e t  de
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l a  v ie ;  Prejuge de p re tend re  fonder l a  pedagogie
exelusivem ent su r l a  psychologie............... S i l e
psychologisme, abandonne p a r to u t , regne encore en 
pedagogie, c 'e s t  au p lus grand de trim en t des sa ines 
no tions d 'e d u c a tio n . Prejuge de p re tend re  fonder 
l a  pedagogie su r l a  seu le p ra tiq u e  em pirique. L1 
experience p ra tiq u e  e s t  in d isp en sab le , mais e l l e  ne 
se comprend elle-meme qu 'en  ra iso n  des p rin c ip e s  qui 
l a  d i r ig e n t .  ^ Prejuge de v o u li t  red u ire  l a  pedagogie 
a l a  seu le  m ethodoligie pedagogique, c 'e s t  a d ire  a 
ce qui n 'e s t  que l e  m a te r ie l de l a  pedagogie."(6)
The plan th a t  w i l l  be followed in  t h i s  work w il l  be 
as follow s:
The nex t chap ter w i l l  deal with the  main p re ju d ices  
th a t  are  found in  cu rren t systems o f educational d ire c t io n ,  
and w ill  c o n s is t o f  an expose o f th e  systems w ith  a c r i t i ­
cism o f each.
The follow ing ch ap ter w il l  d ea l w ith th e  ph ilo soph ica l 
t r u th s  which should form th e  bases o f a sound system o f ed­
u ca tio n a l d ire c tio n . This second sec tio n  w il l  have two d iv i ­
s io n s . The f i r s t  d iv is io n  w il l  t r e a t  the  m etaphysical t ru th s  
th a t  are  im m ediately connected w ith th e  p rocess o f education . 
The second d iv is io n  w il l  t r e a t  th e  psychological t ru th s  th a t  
are  immediately connected w ith th e  process o f education .
The next ch ap te r w i l l  t r e a t  th e  su b jec tiv e  development 
o f th e  person who i s  the  sub jec t o f th e  educational p rocess. 
The plan o f  t h i s  work may seem to  be overam bitious.
But th e  aim and the  claim  o f the w r ite r  i s  merely to  p re se n t, 
in  o rd e r, th e  r e q u is i te  background th a t ,  from th e  very  n a tu re
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)
o f th in g s , must be p resen t in  a philosophy o f education 
th a t  w i l l  serve the ends o f t r u th .
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CHAPTER I I  
Current Systems o f Educational D irection  
P art I  Naturalism
In  a very  recen t is su e  o f one o f  our Canadian
(1)
m agazines, M aclean^ , th e re  i s  an a r t i c l e  which i s  o f 
in te r e s t  to  the  s tuden t o f education . The a r t i c le  in  i t ­
s e l f  i s  o f  no g re a t v a lu e . I t  spends sev era l pages des*» 
c r ib in g  a school in  England where complete se lf-e x p re ss io n  
i s  th e  ru le  o f  l i f e .  I t  d esc rib es  th e  l i f e  in  d e t a i l ,  w ith  
sp e c ia l s tr e s s  on th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  only reg u la tio n s  bind­
ing  on th e  ch ild re n  are  a few p ro h ib itio n s , e . g . ,  sexual 
in te rc o u rse , and th a t  th e s e  few r e s t r i c t io n s  are  in  fo rc e , 
not because the  educational a u th o r i t ie s  o f  the  school wish 
to  r e s t r i c t  the  p u p ils  bu t because th e re  might be an un­
favourable re a c tio n  on th e  p a r t  o f th e  p aren ts  and guardians 
o f the c h ild re n . The reason why th i s  a r t i c le  i s  o f in te r e s t  
to  th e  student o f  education l i e s  in  th e  fa c t  th a t  a magazine 
would take  the  tro u b le  to  pub lish  an a r t i c l e  o f such a n a tu ra . 
I t  i s  a recognized f a c t  th a t  any p h ilo so p h ica l thought takes 
a generation  and a h a lf  to  p en e tra te  to  the  masses o f the 
people; th e  process c o n s is ts  in  having the  thought worked 
out in  th e  mind of th e  ph ilosopher, then  being tra n sm itte d , 
by teach ing  o r  by w r itin g , to  th e  nex t generation  who, in
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tu r n ,  are  th e  teae h e rs  and le a d e rs  o f th e  succeeding genera­
t io n s  o f youth . The id eas  o f t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  which are now 
being put in to  p ra c t ic e ,  have th e  fa m ilia r  h is to ry .  They 
fo llow , and en large  upon, and put in to  p ra c tic e  th e  teach ­
ings o f th e  Philosophers o f Nature o f th e  XlXth cen tu ry .
The ro o ts  o f t h i s  s t r e s s  on N aturalism  are in  them selves 
a n t i - in t e l l e c tu a l ,  and even a n t i - r a t io n a l .  The fa th e r  o f 
the  modern school o f naturalism  i s  w ithout doubt Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778) and i t  was th e  p u b lica tio n  o f h is  roman­
t i c  novel "Smile" in  1762 th a t  drew th e  a tte n tio n  o f  th e  
world to  h is  n a tu r a l i s t i c  teach ings on th e  theory  o f educa­
t io n .  "He sa id  th a t  c h ild re n  should be allowed to  fo llow
t h e i r  n a tu ra l  in c l in a t io n s ,  in s te ad  of being d riven  to  a r t i -
(2)
f i c i a l  s tu d ie s  which th ey  d e te s te d  and which corrupted  them." 
L eft to  h im self th e  in flu en ce  of Rousseau might no t have been 
so g r e a t ,  fo r  i t  i s  ra th e r  d i f f i c u l t  to  take se rio u s ly  a man 
who proclaim s " I f  I  am not a  s a in t ,  who is ? "  I t  m atte rs  
l i t t l e  th a t  the Queen o f France and her la d ie s  played a t  
being dairym aids. But what was o f importance was th e  fa c t  
th a t  many of th e  te a c h e rs  and w r ite rs  f e l l  under h is  in f lu ­
ence. David Hume was fond of him and befriended  him. Thomas 
Paine was indeb ted  to  him f o r  a  la rg e  p a r t o f h is  p o l i t i c a l  
philosophy. Herder f a i r l y  worshipped him. Kant took many 
o f h is  id e a s , and a f t e r  p u ttin g  them through h is  i d e a l i s t i c
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c a te g o r ie s , spread them throughout Germany. This was th e  
ro o t o f  the  ’’Back to  Nature" movement in  th e  modern w orld , 
and th e  in flu en ce  o f i t  i s  s t i l l  to  be f e l t ,  in  r e l ig io n ,  
p o l i t i c s ,  so c ie ty  and, as  i s  c le a r  from the  a r t i c l e  men­
tio n ed  above, in  the f ie ld  o f educational philosophy.
Of course i t  i s  not th e  raw and unpa la tab le  a n t i -  
in te l le c tu a lis m  o f Rousseau h im self th a t  i s  taugh t today*
The d o ctrin e  has been adapted and made resp ec tab le  by a 
host o f w r i te r s .  I t  has been reduced to  p r in c ip le s ,  in ­
te g ra te d  and made sy stem atic , and i t s  name has been changed 
to  meet th e  lo c a l  co nd itions in  which i t  grew. In  F rance,
(3)
th e  teach ing  gained p o p u la rity  under th e  name of P ositiv ism  
and i t s  p ro ta g o n is ts  were Renan, Claude Bernard, T aine, L i t t r e ,  
LeDantes and a  host o f le s s e r  l i g h t s .  In  England i t  was John 
S tu a rt M ill , and above a l l  Darwin and Spencer who spread the  
ideas o f N aturalism  and th e  whole movement came to  be known 
as "Evolutionism ". The p u b lic a tio n , in  1859, o f th e  "O rigin 
o f Species" o f Darwin i s  an im portant m ilestone in  th e  pro­
g ress  o f N aturalism  in  the c u ltu re  o f Europe. In  Germany i t  
was taken  up by the l e f t  wing fo llow ers o f Hegel, Feuerbach, 
S tra u ss , Vogt, Buchner, M oleschott and Gzolbe. Haeckel gave 
to  N aturalism  the  t i t l e  o f "Materialism". In  I t a ly  n a tu r a l is t ic  
teach ings were spread  by Lombroso, S e rg i, and Ardigo*
The basic  teach in g  o f th e  N a tu ra l is ts ,  and o f th o se  l a t e r
*
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v a r ia t io n s  o f N aturalism , i s  concerned w ith  th e  n a tu re  o f 
man.
"The question  o f questions -  th e  question  which 
i s  th e  foundation o f a l l  th e  o th e rs  and which 
holds us more than  any o th e r i s  the  problem of 
the  p lace which man occupies in  Nature and th a t  
o f h is  re la t io n s  to  th e  U niverse.
In  o ther words, fo r  the  N a tu ra l is t ,  as fo r  a l l  Philoso­
phers, th e  fundamental question  i s :  ‘'What i s  th e  r e la t io n
o f man to  n a tu re , o f body to  so u l, of s p i r i tu a l  l i f e  to  
sen s ib le  l i f e ,  o f  man to  the  anim al?1’ And the  answer which 
i s  given to  th i s  problem i s  th e  axiom which i s  th e  base of 
N a tu ra lis t ic  teach ing  on a l l  p o in ts .  The axiom i s  th i s :  
"Nature comes f i r s t ,  man fo llow s: th e  s p i r i tu a l  f a c to r  in
l i f e  i s  t o t a l l y  dependent on th e  co rpo ra l and th e  m a te r ia l."
" la  Science approche e n f in , e t  e l le  approche 
de l ’homme. C 'e s t  a l'am e q u 'e l le  s 'e n  prend, 
munie des instrum ents exact e t  per<jants dont 
t r o i s  cent ans d 1experience ont prouve l a  ju s t -  
esse e t  mesure l a  p o r te e . La pensee e t  son de- 
veloppement, sa  s tru c tu re  e t  ses a tta c h e s , ses 
profondes ra c in e s  c o rp o re lle s , sa v eg e ta tio n  
in f in ie  a t ra v e rs  l 'h i s t o i r e ,  sa  haute f lo ra iso n  
au sommet des choses, v o ila  m aintenant son o b jec t 
............. l'homme e s t  un p ro d u it comme to u te  chose
The im p lica tio n s  o f th i s  axiom are  immense and the
thought i s  c a r r ie d  over in to  th e  whole f i e ld  o f human
a c t iv i ty .  The guiding p r in c ip le s  o f l i f e  and o f a U  human
ac tio n  are  derived  from th i s  p r in c ip le .  I t  i s  worth w hile
to  examine in  d e ta i l s  th e  more concrete  p r in c ip le s  o f  th is
school o f  thought in  t h e i r  a p p lic a tio n .
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The f i r s t  p r in c ip le ,  and the  one from which th e  whole
movement derives its name, is that of the Sovereignity of
(6)
M ature, The theo ry  o f Copernicus i s  taken  as a  symbol o f th e  
s h if t in g  o f emphasis from th e  geocen tric  th eo ry , th a t  th e  
world was the  c e n te r  o f c re a tio n , and th a t  man was the  
summit of a l l  th e  c re a tu re s , t o  the  th eo ry  th a t  the world 
was simply one o f many w orlds, an in s ig n if ic a n t  p a r t ic le ,  
and th a t  man, as aL1 the  r e s t  o f the  w orld, was a very min­
u te  p a r t  and a very unim portant p a rt in  th e  scheme o f N ature. 
C losely a l l i e d  w ith the  th eo ry  of Nature as Supreme was th e  
theory  o f M a te r ia l is t ic  E vo lu tio n . This th eo ry  was a 
m echanistic one, and held  th a t  man was e n t i r e ly  formed, 
dominated and reg u la ted  by fo rc e s  in  M ature, and th ese  
fo rces were m a tte r  and movement,
A n a tu ra l c o ro lla ry  of th e  p r in c ip le  of th e  Supremacy o f 
Nature was the  p r in c ip le  th a t  th e  supreme science was the  
Science of N ature. Formerly i t  was held  th a t  each science 
in  i t s  own f ie ld  and using  i t s  own proper method was an 
instrum ent fo r  th e  a t ta in in g  of t r u th  in  i t s  m anifold 
a sp ec ts . But w ith  the  N a tu ra l is ts  the  only science was 
th e  experim ental study o f N ature, and the  only way to  
a r r iv e  a t  t r u th  was by t h i s  s tudy . The e f fe c ts  o f th i s  are 
c a r r ie d  over to  our p resen t day in  the obvious f a c t  th a t  
th e  le ad e rs  in  sc ience  a re  regarded as th e  g rea t benefac to rs
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o f mankind, the  prophets and th e  sages, th e  new priesthood
o f t r u th  and th e  a p o s tle s  o f th e  new l i f e .  I t  i s  in  th i s
s p i r i t  o f na tu ra lism  th a t  men l ik e  E in s te in , th e  p h y s ic is t ,
are  quoted as a u th o r it ie s  on every th ing  from the  ex istence
of God to  the  b e n e f its  of th e  New Look. At le a s t  t h i s  was
the case t i l l  th e  in v en tio n  of th e  atomic bomb shook the
world out o f i t s  complacency, and made men r e a l iz e  th a t  the
world o f sc ien ce , w ithout d ire c tio n  and moral ru lin g  was
rushing mankind to  d is a s te r .
N.B, The ev o lu tio n  re fe r re d  to  in  th e  l a s t  page, 
i s  not the s c ie n t i f ic  theo ry  which i s  held  by man, 
on s c ie n t i f ic  grounds, th e t  th e re  has been an evolu­
t io n  in  th e  forms of m a te r ia l l iv in g  th in g s  found 
in  our w orld. This theo ry  stands o r f a l l s  on i t s  
s c ie n t i f ic  b ases . The th eo ry  here re fe rre d  to  i s  
th e  m a te r ia l is t ic  dogma of th e  Philosophic Evolu­
t i o n i s t s  who pretend to  ex p la in  and account f o r  a l l  
in  th e  world by the d o c tr in e  o f m a te ria l and mechani­
s t i c  ev o lu tio n . The method th a t  was s a n c tif ie d  and 
made the unique method of d iscovery  o f t r u th  was 
ca lled  the  r e a l i s t i c  method, o r th e  experim ental 
method, and from th ese  names we rece iv e  th e  v ario u s  
d esigna tions used fo r  the  whole philosophy, S cien tism , 
Empiricism or P o sitiv ism . The techniques used in  t h i s  
method were o b se rv a tio n , experience, ind u ctio n  and 
experiment a t io n .
Consequent upon th i s  e x a lta tio n  of P o sitiv ism  and mechan­
ism was th e  d e n ia l o f r e l ig io n . The v ario u s  q u a rre ls  which 
were so dominant in  th e  re lig io u s  f i e ld  in  the  recen t p a s t 
have t h e i r  o r ig in  here ; th e  q u a rre l between F a ith  and Reason; 
S u p e rs titio n  and Knowledge; R evela tion  and E volu tion; Science 
and R elig ion ; Supernaturalism  and N aturalism ; Dogma and
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Sceptism: a l l  these  q u a rre ls  have t h e i r  o r ig in  in  th e  f a c t
th a t  N aturalism , by pretending  to  l im it  t ru th  to  mere 
m a te ria l and physical and observable th in g s ,  n a tu ra lly  de­
n ied  any t ru th  to  th in g s  which were purely  in te l le c tu a l  
orwere beyond th e  scope of p h y s ica l experim entation .
Another consequence o f t h i s  domination o f P o sitiv ism  
was the  d en ia l o f the  r ig h ts  o f philosophy o r of meta­
physics to  th e i r  claim  o f t r u th .  I t  was th e  claim  o f  th e  
p ro tag o n is ts  o f  P ositiv ism  th a t  philosophy was purely  
th e o r e t ic ,  a b s tra c t  and out o f  touch with the r e a l i t i e s  
o f l i f e .  The p as t w ith a l l  i t s  confusion belonged to  
philosophy, bu t th e  fu tu r e ,  b r ig h t w ith  th e  promise o f 
a l l  good th in g s  fo r  man, belonged to  N atural Science.
But i t  was man who su ffe red  th e  g re a te s t re v e rsa l in
th i s  new scheme of th in g s .  The consequence of the  d e n ia l 
o f the s u p e r io r i ty  o f th e  so u l, o f  th e  in s is te n c e  on th e  
m a te r ia l i s t ic  evo lu tion  o f  man, removed him from h is  t r a ­
d i t io n a l  p lace on th e  p innacle  o f ea r th  and placed him very  
low in  th e  s c a le  o f v a lu e s . And the  dethronement o f man
le d  to  th e  le ssen in g  of th e  value o f a l l  human a c tio n . Art
and L ite ra tu re  must be impregnated w ith th e  methods and 
techniques o f N aturalism . The c l in ic a l  d e sc rip tio n  o f 
the  f a c ts  of l i f e  was done by th e  w r i te r s  of the  school, 
Zola, Goncourt, Dumas F i l s ,  F lau b e rt, B eaudelaire , leco n te
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de L is le ,  S u lly  Prudhomme and a  host o f  o th er so -c a lle d  
R e a lis ts .  The same ideas were c a r r ie d  over to  th e  f i e ld  
o f m orals , no lo n g er was i t  a question  o f what was r ig h t  
o r wrong, bu t a question  o f what was or was no t u se fu l in  
c e r ta in  circum stances. In  t ru e  m a te r ia l is t ic  manner 
economic values took the  p lace  o f moral v a lu es , and even 
l i g h t  was reduced to  th e  le v e l o f Force. The measure o f 
m orals was a r r iv e d  a t  by an in d u c tiv e  study o f th e  moral 
l i f e  o f  various peop les, and the r i g h t  way o f m o ra lity  
was deduced from th e  moral s ta te  o f th e  peoples under study .
A s tr ik in g  example o f t h i s  i s  to  be found in  th e  re c e n tly  
pub lished , and much p u b lic ized  Kinsey Report on the  sexual 
behaviour o f males in  America, which was a s t a t i s t i c a l  
study o f the  sex h a b its  o f  th e  American male and, as such, 
has the value o f  any s t a t i s t i c a l  study, w ith a l l  i t s  l im ita ­
t io n s ,  But th e  p o in t o f in te r e s t  to  the  studen t o f education­
a l  theory  i s  th a t  he a rriv ed  a t  th e  conclusion th a t  the sex 
standards of the people must be changed, because o f th e  f in d ­
in g s  o f the su rveyors. This i s  a c le a r  example o f th e  in roads 
o f N aturalism  on th e  moral o rd e r. I t  was th e  c laim , and th e  
lo g ic a l  claim  o f th e  n a tu r a l i s t ,  th a t  man was a s o c ia l u n i t ,  
a c e l l  in  th e  so c ia l s tru c tu re ,  and had th e  r ig h ts  th a t  be­
longed to  a u n i t  o f  so c ie ty ; in  t h i s  way th e  in d iv id u a l was 
s tre sse d  as th e  u n i t ,  but th e  way was paved fo r  l a t e r  s o c ia l-
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i s t i c  development. The same id eas  make th e  h is to ry  o f man 
and h is  c u ltu re  depend on the  ph y sica l f a c to rs  which surround 
him, to  the  exclusion  o f  s p i r i tu a l  m o tiva tion . These f a c to rs  
were b io lo g ic a l and economic, and were the foundations o f a l l  
c u l tu re .
The impact o f th ese  p r in c ip le s  on education i s  easy 
to  foresee* The man who embodied and proclaimed th e  educa­
t io n a l  p r in c ip le s  o f N aturalism  was H erbert Spencer (1820-1903). 
They a re  se t fo r th  in  a s e r ie s  o f volumes which he published 
from th e  years  i860 to  1896; 1 . General P r in c ip le s . (1862).
2 . B io log ical P r in c ip le s . (1864). 3 . Psychological P r in c i­
p le s . (1870). 4 . S ocio log ica l P r in c ip le s . (1876). 5* Moral 
P r in c ip le s  (1891), and a work on Pedagogy "Education: I n te l l e c t ­
u a l .  Moral and P hysical” . (1898). The tone o f h is  teach ing  may 
be c le a r ly  gathered  from th e  fo llow ing q u o ta tio n s:
” . . . .How to  develop th e  body? How to  d i r e c t  th e  in ­
te ll ig e n c e ?  How to  run business? In  what way must 
one r a is e  h is  fam ily? How must one f u l f i l l  h is  duty 
as c it iz e n ?  In  what manner must we use a l l  th e  goods 
o f n a tu re  which a re  given to  man? What i s  the  b e s t 
way to  employ a l l  our f a c u l t ie s  f o r  our own g re a te s t  
good and fo r  th a t  o f o th ers?  How to  l iv e  a complete 
l i f e . . . . . th i s  i s  th e  g re a t th in g  th a t  education  must 
te a c h . To prepare us fo r  a  complete l i f e ,  t h i s  i s  th e  
end o f ed u ca tio n ."(7 )
These are  the  questions which Spencer asked; what i s  th e
answer he g ives? In  th e  same work he says:
" . . t h e  f i r s t  co n d itio n  o f  success in  th i s  world i s  
to  be a good anim al, and the  f i r s t  cond ition  o f n a tio n ­
a l  p ro sp e r ity  i s  th a t  th e  n a tio n  be formed of good a n i­
m als."(o )
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And H erbert Spencer i s  a re p re se n ta tiv e  man o f  the N atu ra l­
i s t i c  School o f Pedagogy and h is  in flu en ce  i s  w idespread. 
P resid en t Charles W.ELiot says in  h is  In tro d u c tio n  to  the 
Pedagogy of Spencer:
"By Spencer, th e  pedagogical ideas o f Comenius, 
Montaigne, Locke, M ilton, Rousseau, P e s ta lo z z i 
and o th e rs  were spread on a grand sca le  among 
th e  p ra c tic in g  te a c h e r s ."(9)
P a r t Two: C ritic ism  of N aturalism
Por a p h ilo so p h ica l c r i t ic is m  of N aturalism  th e re  i s
bu t one necessary  procedure, and th a t  i s  the  exam ination
o f the  fundamental axiom o f the  system and a c r i t ic is m  o f
th a t  axiom in  th e  l ig h t  o f u n iv e rsa lly  recognized t r u th s .
The axiom, as s ta te d  above, p . 1 2 , reads: L'hdmme e s t  un
(10)
produit comme to u t  chose.  Man, l ik e  th e  r e s t  o f the  
m a te r ia l world i s  a product of the fo rces o f n a tu re , and 
"nature", in  th i s  axiom, means m a te r ia l n a tu re . The im p lica­
tio n s  o f th e  axiom have been poin ted  out above, bu t fo r  th e  
sake o f u n ity  th re e  of th e  main im p lica tio n s  w i l l  be here 
rep ea ted .
1 . Nature i s  th e  g rea t r e a l i t y .  This means th a t  
natu re  i s  th e  god of th e  system.
2 . The Sclenae o f Nature i s  th e  supreme sc ien ce .
That i s  to  s ay, experim ental science i s  the  
only source o f t r u th .
3 .  The laws o f natu re  a re  immutable. This means 
th a t  man i s  determ ined by m a te ria l circum stances.
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The r e s u l ts  o f  such a  system of thought are  c l e a r .  The 
freedom o f man i s  destroyed  by making him th e  c rea tu re  o f 
m a tte r . And w ith th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f  freedom comes the  des­
t ru c t io n  of m o ra lity , f o r  a man who i s  not f re e  cannot be a 
moral agent o r have moral r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  True Science i s  
destroyed , because by l im itin g  man to  m atter any r e a l  know­
ledge o f th in g s  through th e i r  causes ceases to  have meaning; 
indeed th e  very natu re  o f  a causa l r e la t io n  i s  destroyed .
And w ith  th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f c a u sa lity  comes the a n n ih ila tio n  
of philosophy which i s  the knowledge o f th in g s  by knowledge 
o f t h e i r  u ltim ate  cau ses.
Obviously the  c r i t ic is m  o f  th e  P r in c ip le s  o f N aturalism  
w il l  be based on th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  in  s p ite  o f th e  claim  o f the  
N a tu ra lis ts  to  be o b je c tiv e , experim ental and r e a l i s t i c ,  
they  are in  r e a l i ty  lim ite d  by t h e i r  p re ju d ices  to  a narrow 
and incomplete conception o f  both man and n a tu re . They only 
consider the  animal p a r t  o f man; th ey  f a i l  to  tak e  in to  
account h is  ev id en t reasoning power, h is  in te l l e c tu a l  power 
and a l l  the  s p i r i tu a l  fo rces  th a t  make the  complete man. 
Consequently, t h e i r  system o f education  i s  lopsided  because 
they  deal w ith the  in f e r io r  a sp ec ts  o f man to  th e  exclusion  
of the su p erio r a sp e c ts . Their sca le  o f values i s  com pletely 
reversed ; they  p lace science above re lig io n ; th ey  p lace th e  
body above th e  s p i r i t ;  th ey  p lace m atte r above form. In  sh o rt,
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t h e i r  education ceases to  be an education  and degenerates 
in to  an ad ap ta tio n  o f man to  th e  m a te r ia l circum stances 
surrounding him.
This i s ,  I  th in k , a  f a i r  statem ent o f the  p o s itio n  
o f th e  N a tu ra lis t  in  education , and a f a i r  and o b jec tiv e  
statem ent of th e  f a t a l  l im ita tio n s  which such a system im­
poses, w ithout a u th o r ity  and w ithout reason , on t h e i r  sys­
tem o f education .
P a r t Three: R adical Socialism
The use o f th e  term  R adical-S oeialism  as a  t i t l e  o f  
a se c tio n  dealing  w ith a philosophy o f education should be 
ra p id ly  explained because of the f a ls e  no tions which might 
sp ring  to  the mind a t  the use o f such dangerous w ords. The 
meaning o f the words R adical Socialism  as used here i s  t h i s :  
the  theo ry  which p laces th e  community a t  th e  fo c a l p o in t in  
a l l  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f l i f e .  I  want to  po in t out th a t  th e re  
w i l l  be as many forms of R adical Socialism  as th e re  are  ideas 
of what th e  community i s ,  and what the re la tio n s h ip  i s  th a t  
e x is ts  between th e  community and i t s  component p a r t s .  The 
fundamental p o s itio n  o f the  R adical S ocia l School i s  found 
in  the answer th a t  th e y  give to  t h i s  q u e s tio n . There i s  
found here a d e f in i te  re a c tio n  to  th e  in d iv id u a l is t ic  theo ry  
propounded by Rousseau and h is  fo llo w e rs , whose in s is ta n c e
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on th e  independence of the  in d iv id u a l from so c ie ty  led  to  
th e  extremes of se lf-e x p re ss io n  th a t  are found in  some 
modern educational p h ilo so p h ies . But a re a c tio n  was bound 
to  s e t  i n .  There i s  an open c o n f l ic t  between the  d e s ire s  
o f th e  in d iv id u a l and the  common good, and in  many cases i t  
i s  obvious th a t  so -ca lled  se lf -e x p re ss io n  and independence 
w i l l  lead  to  s o c ia l chaos* To avoid t h i s  chao tic  cond ition  
the  proper re la t io n s h ip  between the  in d iv id u a l and the 
community must be c la r i f i e d .  The p o s itio n  taken  by th e  
R ad ica l-S o c ia l School i s  th a t  the so c ie ty  -  whatever they  
may p o s tu la te  as the so c ia l u n i t  -  holds th e  supreme p lac e , 
and th a t  the in d iv id u a l i s  subordinate to  so c ie ty  and i s  in  a 
c e r ta in  sense a product o f th e  so c ie ty .
There a re  many and v a ried  expressions of th e  n o tio n  th a t  
the so c ie ty  i s  th e  end and purpose of th e  in d iv id u a l. There 
are  numberless degrees o f subord ination  o f th e  in d iv id u a l 
to  th e  so c ia l body. But th e  basic  eoncept o f the  subordina­
t io n  of the in d iv id u a l to  so c ie ty  i s  to  be found in  most o f 
th e  modern p h ilo so p h ies , and consequently in  most o f the  
modern ph ilosophies of education . The f i r s t  proponents o f 
th i s  school o f thought a re  Auguste Conte and h is  fo llo w ers 
in  France, Emile Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl, but th e  most in ­
f lu e n t ia l  in  th e  E nglish-speaking world i s  John Dewpgr, and 
fo r  th e  purposes o f t h i s  work i t  w i l l  be s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  us
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to  examine th e  main p o in ts  o f h is  d o c trin e  and p resen t a 
c r i t iq u e  of those  views,
John Dewey, th e  p h ilo so p h ica l h e i r  o f W illiam James, 
was bom in  1859, au American. He received  h is  degree as 
Doctor o f Philosophy from th e  Johns Hopkins U n iversity  in  
B altim ore, tau g h t a t  Michigan and Chicago, and spent th e  r e ­
mainder o f h is  l i f e  as P ro fesso r o f Philosophy a t  Columbia 
U n iversity  in  New York C ity ,
The w ritin g s  o f Dewey may be l i s t e d  under two headings: 
those th a t  dea l w ith Philosophy in  g en e ra l, and those th a t  
are  s p e c if ic a l ly  concerned w ith th e  Philosophy o f Education,
The f i r s t  group, those  o f general Philosophy, a r e ,  in  th e  
o rder o f  t h e i r  appearance: Psychology (1886); L e ib n itz  (1888);
E th ics  (1893)J Essays in  Experim ental Logic (1916, Un, of 
Chicago P re ss ); How We Think (1909, London, Heath and C o,);
The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays (1910, 
Henry H o lt, New York); German Philosophy and P o l i t ic s  (1915, 
Henry H o lt, New York); Human Nature and Conduct (1921, London, 
A lle n ) , He i s  a lso  th e  au thor of numerous a r t ic le s  in  various 
review s. In  the  second group, h is  works on E ducational Philo­
sophy, we fin d  th e  fo llow ing works; The School and S o c ie ty  
(1899); My Pedagogic Creed (1902); The Educational S itu a tio n  
(1903); Moral P r in c ip le s  in  Education (Boston, 1905); I n te re s t  
and E ffo r t  (Boston, 1907); How We Think (1912; Schools o f
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Tomorrow (1915, Dent, London)j and a s e r ie s  o f a r t i c l e s  in  
th e  Monroe Cyclopedia of E ducation. A sp e c ia l e d it io n  o f 
the  essays o f Dewey on education was published in  England 
by P ro fesso r F indley of M anchester under th e  t i t l e :  Edu­
c a tio n a l Essays by John Dewey, in  two volumes.
To a r r iv e  a t  an adequate conception of th e  views which 
Dewey holds concerning l i f e ,  and which he c a r r ie s  over in to  
the  f i e ld  o f pedagogy, a b r ie f  exam ination o f h is  fundamental 
p o s itio n  i s  in  o rd e r. The approach of Dewey to  l i f e  may be 
summed up in  th re e  words, i t  i s  pragm atic, i t  i s  experim ental, 
and i t  i s  s o c ia l i s t i c .
Dewey’s pragmatic b a s is  i s  w ell s ta te d  by h im self in  an 
a r t i c l e  w r itte n  in  October 1924:
”Action takes precedence} w ithout i t ,  thought and 
knowledge remain u s e le s s . Theory i s  th e  r e s u l t  o f 
p r a c t ic e .  Thoughts, hypotheses, concep ts, p h ilo ­
sophies must be subm itted to  th e  touchstone o f the  
p ra c t ic a l  l i f e .  Considered in  them selves th ey  are  
n e ith e r  t ru e  nor f a l s e ,  they  become so in  as much 
as they assure th e  success or f a i lu r e  o f our a c tio n s .
The most c e r ta in  touchstone o f t r u th  i s  i t s  p r a c t ic a l  
r e s u l t ;  th ru th  i s  an instrum ent fo r  moving, s a t i s f y ­
in g , enrich ing  and ennobling our l iv e s .  Everything 
th a t  i s  connected w ith  knowledge, though t, w ith  th e  
concepts o f l i f e ,  t r u th ,  wisdom and b e l ie f  must be 
c ite d  before th e  t r ib u n a l ,  not o f reason nor i n t e l l i -  
gence, but o f  a c tio n , in  th e  g re a te s t  sense o f th e  word."
This s e le c tio n  p laces before us c le a r ly  th e  s tandard  and the
measure of a l l  t  ru th  in  the  system of Dewey.
The unique enthronement o f ind u ctio n  and th e  use o f
th e  experim ental method i s  another foundation stone o f the
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pedagogy o f Dewey. In  h is  in te re s t in g  work How We Think he 
says:
" . . .  .th e  end envisaged i s  th e  b ring ing  fo r th  
and the fo s te r in g  o f t h i s  a t t i tu d e  o f mind, 
th i s  manner o f th in k in g  which we d escribe  as 
s c i e n t i f i c (1 2 )
He goes on to  s ta te :
n . . . . f r u i t f u l  and complete thought i s  po ssib le  
only when one employs in  some way th e  ex p eri­
m ental m ethod.(l3)
I t  must be kept in  mind th a t  th e  experim ental method, envisaged
by Dewey, i s  not ex c lu siv e ly  the s c ie n t i f i c  method of the
European school, in  fa c t  i t  i s  no t p rim arily  t h i s  method, bu t
ra th e r  i t  i s  one o f induction  app lied  to  common experience.
I t  i s  the  s p i r i t  o f those  who are  always quoting th e  "c©mmon-
sense way of doing th in g s" . And i t  f i t s  in  c lo se ly  w ith h is
no tions of the  p r a c t ic a l  value which th in g s  must have, as he
says:
" . . . . a l l  th in g s  must be subm itted to  th e  o rdeal 
by f i r e . . . . t r i a l  be se rv ices  re n d e re d ." (14)
The term applied  when we c a lle d  the  id eas  o f Dewey 
" S o c ia l is t ic "  i s  not used in  th e  o rd inary  connotation  o f th e  
word s o c ia l i s t i c .  We do no t mean th a t  i t  i s  merely a p o l i t i ­
c a l theory  o f common ownership. I t  i s  something deeper than  
t h a t ,  and fo r  th a t  reason I  have q u a lif ie d  i t  by th e  ad je c tiv e  
"R adical", denoting th a t  h is  p o s itio n  i s  one th a t  goes to  the 
ro o t of th e  m a tte r, and lay s  the  ph ilo so p h ica l b a s is  fo r  a l l
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forms o f so c ia l supremacy. For Dewey so c ia l cond itions have
th e  predominant p lace  in  any philosophy of l i f e . So so c ia l
problems not only loom la rg e  in  h is  philosophy, bu t th e  whole
fa b r ic  o f h is  philosophy i s  so c ia liz e d . The d ire c t io n , th e
purpose, the i d e a l ,  the means employed and th e  p r in c ip le s  of
h is  philosophy o f  l i f e  must f in d  t h e i r  source and fo c a l po in t
in  the needs o f so c ie ty . Speaking o f h is  basic  philosophy,
Dewey d ec la re s :
"Our s o c ia l  o rg an iza tio n  fo rces  us to  accept th i s  
philosophy o f l i f e . "(15)
The above d e sc rip tio n  and q uo ta tions p lace Dewey in  
th e  p o s itio n  o f reform er in  th e  f ie ld  o f l i f e ,  and make him 
of n ec e ss ity  a reform er in  th e  f ie ld  of Philosophy o f Educa­
t io n .  And he i s  a reform er w ith  honor even in  h is  own coun­
t r y .  H. Suzzalo, in  th e  In tro d u c tio n  which he wrote fo r  
Moral P rin c ip le s  in  Education, says:
"He (Dewey) i s  a th in k e r ,  whose in flu en ce  on 
educational reform i s  equalled  by n o n e ." d ° )
He deeply  in fluenced  such men as P ro f. F indley in  England,
and G. K erschenste iner, th e  well-known e d u c a tio n a lis t  in
Germany, the  p ro ta g o n is t o f  the  "Arbeitsschule" ( th e  "ac tiv e
sc h o o l" ) , Dewey h im self demanded a rev o lu tio n  in  education:
"These a re  the  ra d ic a l co n d itio n s  o f l i f e  which must 
be rev o lu tio n ize d , and only a ra d ic a l  pedagogical 
reform  can give s a t i s f a c t io n ." (1?)
He opposes th e  t r a d i t io n a l  system o f education because i t
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cannot, in  h is  e s tim a tio n , f u l f i l l  th e  demands of the  p resen t
cond ition  o f so c ie ty .
'•T rad itional education forms c i t iz e n s  who have no 
sympathy fo r  manual work and who a re  possessed of 
no norm which w il l  allow  them to  conceive th e  g re a t 
s o c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  problems o f our e p o c h ." (l° )
These key id eas  o f Dewey: Pragmatism, Experim entalism ,
and R ad ica l-S ocia lism , are  c a r r ie d  over in to  a l l  h is  expressions
of pedagogical philosophy.
"Education must be so c ia liz e d  by making th e  school 
a c e l l  o f r e a l  l i f e . "(19)
And he s ta te s  c le a r ly  what he means by c e l l s  of r e a l  l i f e  -
"S ocial in s ig h t ,  s o c ia l  s tre n g th  and s o c ia l in te r e s t :  
th e re  i s  the  t r i n i t y  o f moral &v o lu tio n ." ( 2 0 )
And a l l  branches must be taugh t in  such a way
" . . t h a t  they  w ill  be th e  means o f making the  ch ild  
understand the  s o c ia l  community and l i f e . " (2 1 )
The c a p ita l  c r i t ic is m  which Dewey draws upon h is  system 
may be made in  function  o f th e  prime te n e ts  o f  th a t  system .
In  the f i r s t  p lace , the Pragmatism o f Dewey may be su b jec t to  
c r i t ic is m  because i t  destro y s  th e  c e r t i tu d e  upon which know­
led g e , t r u th  and m ora lity  must be based . A system which makes 
u sefu ln ess  th e  measure and standard  o f human ac tio n  f a i l s  to  
s a t i s f y  the demand o f an in te l l ig e n c e  f o r  t r u th ,  i t  f a i l s  to  
s a t i s fy  th e  demand o f a human w il l  fo r  goodness and th e  obvious 
need of the human person f o r  a standard  o f m orals th a t  w il l  
s a t i s fy  the needs o f a r a t io n a l  p e rso n a lity .
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In  the  second p lace th e  Experimentalism of Dewey must 
be subm itted to  th e  same c r i t ic is m  as th e  Experimentalism o f 
th e  N a tu ra l is ts ,  t h a t  i s ,  th a t  i t  only tak es  in to  considera­
t io n  the observable and measurable o b jec ts  o f knowledge, the  
m a te ria l th in g s  th a t  can be subm itted to  experim entation  and
measurement leav ing  the  mind in  ignorance o f th e  t o t a l i t y
o f r e a l i ty  beyond th e  m a te r ia l and th e  m easurable.
And in  th e  th i r d  in s ta n c e , th e  R adieal-S oeialism  of Dewey 
must be c r i t ic iz e d  on th e  grounds th a t  i t  e r r s  in  making 
so c ie ty  the  supreme c r i te r io n ,  the f in a l  and th e  e f f i c ie n t  
cause o f a l l  th a t  i s  human in  the  w orld. I t  ignores the  
r ig h ts  o f the  human p e rso n a lity  th a t  a re  proper to  i t  a s  an te­
cedent to  a l l  s o c ie ty .
The p o in ts  th a t  are  o ffe red  as c r i t ic is m  here a re  merely 
s ta te d .  They w il l  be enlarged upon and developed l a t e r  in  
th e i r  proper p lace , and reference  w il l  be made th e re  to  th e  
p a r t ic u la r  p o in ts  in  ph ilo soph ies  which f a i l  to  be r e a l i s t i c  
and o b jec tiv e  in  r e la t io n  to  th e  p o in ts  under d iscu ss io n .
An account o f th e  pedagogical philosophy o f  Dewey, how­
ever b r ie f ,  would be incom plete i f  mention were not made of 
some o f the  more famous names which must be tak en  in  conjunction 
w ith  Dewey as philosophers o f the  R adioal-Sociallsm  advocated 
by him. I  w il l  no t make an exhaustive l i s t ,  bu t r a th e r  one 
th a t  i s  exemplary. The names w i l l  be merely those of ou tstand­
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ing educators in  various countries,w ho hold th e  same th e o r ie s  
as Dewey, This i s  no t to  s ta te  th a t  th ey  are  dependent on 
Dewey fo r  e i th e r  t h e i r  id eas  o r th e i r  ex p ression , but to  
s ta te  th a t  they  hold  the  same fundamental p o s itio n s  as Dewey, 
Paul Natorp was born in  D usseldorf January 24, 1854. He 
studied  a t  B e r lin , Bonn and S trasbourg . His works on pedagogy 
are :
1 , Several s tu d ie s  on P e s ta lo z z i:
J.H . P e s ta lo z z i s ien  Leben und siene Leden (Aus
Matur und G e is te sw e lt, L e ipz ig , Teubner 1909)
J.H . P e s ta lo z z i^  Werke: G e ss le r’s K lassik er der 
Padagogik (3 Bande, 19051
Idealism us P e s ta l lo z z is . (1919)
2. On His own pedagogical system:
R elig ion  in n erh a lb  der grebzen d e r Humanitat: Ein
K apitel zur Grundlegung d er Sozialpadagogik.
( i .A . Tubingen).
Socialpadagogik, Theorie d er W illenserzeihung auf
der Grundlage d er Gemeinschaft (1898)
Gesammelte Abhandlingen zur Sozialpadagogil I .
H is tb r isc h e r
Philosophie und Padagogik (1919)
A sample o f h is  philosophy may be taken in  h is  own 
words:
"The in d iv id u a l man, p roperly  speaking, i s  only an 
a b s tra c tio n . n(2 2 )
Paul Beregemann was born in  1863 in  Lowenberg in  S i le s ia  
and was the d ire c to r  o f schools in  S i l e s i a .  His works a re : 
Aphorismen zur Sozialem Padagogik. Id ep z ig , 0-899)
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S oziale  Padagogik auf E rfahrungsw isseenschaft- 
l ic h e r  Grundlage und m it H ilfe  der in d u k tiv en .
Methode a ls  u n iv e rs a l is t is c h e  Oder K ultur-Padagogik. 
d900l
Lehrbuch d er Padag. Psychologies L e ipz ig , Teubner, 
(1901).
And a sentence expressing  h is  thought i s  th i s :
" I t  i s  an i l lu s io n  to  th in k  th a t  man possesses any 
value by h im self and fo r  h i m s e l f , , "  (^3)
G. K erschensteiner was born in  Munich in  1855. At the 
age o f fo r ty ,  in  1 8 9 5 , he became c h ie f  o f the  teach e rs  a t  
Munich and fo r  tw en ty -fiv e  y ears  was busy in  th e  organiza­
t io n  o f s o c ia lly  conscious schools in  Munich. His w ritin g s  
on education are  th e  fo llow ing:
Betrachtungen zur Theorie des L ehrplans. (1899) 
S taa tsb u rg e rlich e  Erzeihung d er deutschen Jugend (1901) 
Die Entwieklung des zeichnerischen  Begabung (1905) 
Grundfragen d e r S chulorgan ization  (1907)
Der B eg riff  d e r S taa tsb u rg er l ic h e n  Erzeihung (1911) 
B e rg riff  d e r  A rbeitsschule (1911)
Zwan z ig  Jahre in n . Schulaufsichtam t (1915)
A revealing  sentence from h is  works gives us th e  tone
of h is  thought:
"Personal p e rfe c tio n , r ig h t  and th e  supreme d ig n ity  
o f p e rso n a lity  c o n s is ts  o f love f o r ,  and s a c r if ic e  
fo r  th e  community."(24)
In  France, the prime exponent o f R adioal-Socialism  was 
Emile Durkheim. He was born in  1858 and became P rofessor 
o f Sociology and Pedagogy a t  Bordeaux and a t P a r is .  He died  
in  1917* His works were c h ie f ly  on Sociology and he and 
Levy-Bruhl may be considered the  le a d e rs  in  so c io lo g ic a l
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thought in  the  modern w orld. His e x p l ic i t  w ritin g s  on 
pedagogy were few, bu t h is  in flu en ce  was enormous* His 
underlying p r in c ip le  i s  s ta te d  in  h is  own words:
"La Societe e s t ,  pour le s  consciences in d iv id u e lle s ,
un o b je c t i f  tran scen d en t."(2 5 )
I t  i s  tru e  th a t  th e re  was a re a c tio n  to  th e  R ad ica l- 
S ocial school o f pedagogy. The le a d e rs  were O tto Willmann, 
F re id rich  Paulsen , W .Toiseher, R ein, P. B arth , Benjamin Kidd 
and sev e ra l o th e rs , who tau g h t a moderate form of educational 
so c ia lism , wherein th e  so c ia l t r a in in g  o f th e  person tak es  a 
very prominent p a r t ,  but th e re  i s  a  proper p roportion  and 
th e  person i s  never s a c r if ic e d  to  th e  transcenden t society*
But th e  in flu en ces  o f th e  la d ic a l - S o c ia l i s t s  a re  very power­
f u l ,  and are  in flu en c in g  th e  educational id eas  o f today . For 
example, in  th e  magazine published by th e  O ntario College of 
Education, th e  purpose given f o r  th e  teach ing  o f h is to ry  i s
" to  prepare p u p ils  to  take  t h e i r  p laces as e f f i c ie n t  members 
(26)
of so c ie ty " . C e rta in ly  I  do no t wish to  m ain tain  th a t  man, 
and e sp e c ia lly  educated man, should not be an e f f ic ie n t  member 
o f s o c ie ty . But the  purpose o f  education i s  something more 
than making e f f ic ie n t  members o f so e ie ty j i t  i s  th e  p e rfe c tio n  
of each person . Many o f  th e  p ro ta g o n is ts  o f modern democracy 
are  fo llow ing in  th e  s tep s  o f th e  R a d ic a l-S o c ia lis ts  in  p lac ­
ing  so c ie ty  and so c ia l u se fu ln ess  as th e  norm and end of a l l  
e x is te n c e . I t  would be w ell f o r  those  who a re  m isled in  th i s
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manner to  read c a re fu lly  the  D eclara tion  of American indepen­
dence:
MWe hold th e se  tru th s  to  be s e l f  ev iden t; th a t  a l l  
men are c rea ted  equal; th a t  they  a re  endowed by 
t h e i r  c re a to r  w ith  c e r ta in  in a lie n a b le  r ig h ts ;  th a t  
among these  are  l i f e ,  l ib e r ty  and th e  p u rsu it o f 
happiness*"
and pay sp ec ia l a t te n t io n  to  th e  use of th e  word " in a lien ab le"  
which p o in ts  out th a t  th e se  personal r ig h ts  cannot be subser­
v ie n t to  th e  so c ie ty . As th e  Report o f th e  Harvard Committee, 
General Education in  a Free S ociety  s ta te s :
" I t  i s  im portan t, however, to  l im i t  the  id ea  o f 
th e  good c i t iz e n  ex p ress ly  by the  id e a l  o f th e  
good m an."(27)
P art Four: N ationalism  and S tatism
A th i r d  in  th e  s e r ie s  of educational ph ilosophies w ith 
which we must d ea l i s  th a t  type o f educational philosophy 
which may be c a lle d  th e  Philosophy o f N ationalism  o r S ta tism . 
N ationalism  o r S ta tism  may be defined  as th a t  theo ry  which 
proclaim s th e  primacy of th e  n a tio n  or o f th e  s ta te  over th a t  
o f th e  person. In  th is  theo ry  th e  n a tio n  o r the s ta te  ru le s  
com pletely th e  l iv e s  o f the  persons who are  th e  members o f 
th e  n a tio n  o r  th e  c i t iz e n s  o f th e  s ta t e .  I t  i s  then  immediate­
ly  apparent th a t  t h i s  philosophy has some th in g s  in  common 
w ith  th e  philosophy o f the R a d ic a l-S o c ia lis ts . In  th e  f i r s t  
p la c e , th e  ro o t problem p o sited  by both schools i s  th e  same,
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th e  r e la t io n  th a t  e x is ts  between th e  in d iv id u a l and th e  so c ia l 
body. The answer given to  t h i s  qu estio n  lay s  th e  b a s is  fo r  
th e  answers to  th e  problems o f l i f e  and education . The R ad ica l- 
S o c ia l is t  s placed th e  In d iv id u a l in  complete su b jec tio n  to  th e  
so c ia l body, but th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  S t a t i s t s  go fu r th e r  
and p lace th e  in d iv id u a l in  complete su b jec tio n  to  a determ ined 
body p o l i t i c ,  to  the  determ ined community, in  th e  case o f th e  
N a tio n a lis ts ,  o r to  the  determ ined in s t i tu t io n ,  in  the case 
o f th e  S t a t i s t s .  And th i s  c lo se  re la t io n s h ip  between th e  two 
schools i s  seen in  th e  genesis  of th e  thought o f th e  founders 
of th e  schoo l. F ic h te , Hegel and B arres, the  f i r s t  spokesmen 
of th i s  type of thought a l l  began as S o c ia l i s t s ,  and developed 
in to  N a tio n a lis ts  and S t a t i s t s ,  And even in  th e  R adical-  
Socialism  of Natorp and K erschensteiner the ce n te r  o f g ra v ity  
i s  seen to  be veering  from so c ie ty  in  general to  a p a r t ic u la r  
so c ie ty , the  Nation and th e  S ta te .  The immediate importance 
o f t h i s  d o c trin e  i s  e a s ily  d isee rn ab le  today in  th e  growing 
s tr e s s  th a t  i s  l a id  on strong  n a tio n a l governments, on n a tio n ­
a l  f e e l in g , and on n a tio n a l p r id e . Some of the  more se rio u s  
consequences were seen in  the l a t e  War when th e  R acial and 
N ational th e o r ie s  o f Germany and I ta ly  showed t h e i r  most 
se rio u s  consequences in  the  attem pt to  sub jec t o th e r peoples.
But th e  e f fe c ts  a re  a lso  q u ite  c le a r  in  our own co u n trie s  and 
in  th e  teach ings o f our own sehoo ls . For example, the  h is to ry
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
P . 3 3
course and, f o r  th a t  m a tte r , any course which has a co n ten t, 
i s  po in ted  toward th e  fo s te r in g  of Canadian N ationalism  as 
something q u ite  d is t in c t iv e  and, a t  th e  same tim e, something 
q u ite  d e s ira b le .
To ap p rec ia te  the philosophy of N ationalism  and S ta tism , 
i t  i s  necessary  to  d iscover what i s  meant by a Nation when 
th e  term  i s  u sed , e i th e r  in  p h ilo so p h ic a l, educational o r 
p o l i t i c a l  co n tex t. The term  Nation has many and v arious 
s ig n if ic a t io n s  bu t they  may be reduced to  sev e ra l basic  
meanings. I  w il l  give th e  b asic  meanings in  which th e  term  
i s  used in  th e  various th e o r ie s  o f N ationalism . These 
th e o r ie s  d iv ide them selves in to  two g en era l groups:
1 . The f i r s t  group hold th e  th eo ry  th a t  the basic  
element in  N ationalism  i s  something o b je c tiv e , 
something im personal o r something p ass iv e , and 
th e  d e f in i t io n  on th a t  b a s is  i s  th e  means of 
c la s s ify in g  th e  v a rio u s  types o f thought.
a) The R ac is t Theory which holds th a t  the  N ation 
has a u n ity  o f blood and physiology. The 
c h ie f  proponents of t h i s  theory  were Gobi- 
neau and Chamberlain.
b) The Geographic Theory which holds th a t  u n ity  
o f t e r r i t o r y ,  o f s o i l s ,  o f c lim ate and so 
fo r th  are the fa c to rs  making a n a tio n . The 
proponents o f t h i s  th eo iy  were R a tze l, K, R itte ij 
Guyot.
c) The United People Theory which holds th a t  each 
community o f people i s  a n a tio n .
The above th re e  th e o r ie s  have t h i s  in  common, 
th a t  th e  b a s is  o f a n a tio n  i s  u n ity  o f language,
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d) The Culture Theory which holds the  essence 
of a n a tio n  l i e s  in  i t s  p e c u lia r  c u ltu re .
The c h ie f  proponent of t h i s  th eo ry  was 
F ic h te .
e) The Language Theory which holds th a t  th e  b a s is  
o f a n a tio n  i s  u n ity  o f language.
f )  The H is to r ic a l Theory which holds th a t  a n a tio n  
i s  formed by the experiences o f h is to ry ,  ex­
periences which a re  common to  a c e r ta in  group 
o f people.
g) The S ta te  Theory which holds th a t  the  n a tio n  
i s  formed by th e  S ta te ,
These th re e  th e o r ie s  have th e  common ground 
of a base th a t  i s  i n t e l l e c tu a l ,  a t  l e a s t  in  
some degree , o f u n ity .
2 . The seeond group of th e o r ie s  holds th a t  th e  b a s is
o f N ationalism  i s  something su b je c tiv e , something
conscious, something p e rso n a l, something c re a t iv e .
The v ario u s  types of t h i s  theo ry  a re :
a) The Theory of S e lf  Consciousness which holds 
th a t  a n a tio n  i s  c o n s ti tu te d  by a conscious­
ness o f i t s  c o lle c tiv e  l i f e .  The ch ie f  pro­
ponent o f t h i s  theory  was Lazarus.
b) The Theory of Sentiment which holds th a t  a 
n a tio n  i s  c o n s titu te d  by th e  sentim ent and 
b e l ie f  of th e  members th a t  i t  i s  a n a tio n .
c) The Theory o f  an Id e a l holds th a t  a n a tio n  
tak es  form because o f the  f a i th  o f th e  mem­
bers o f the group in  a common Id e a l.  This 
theory  was proposed by Spengler.
d) The Theory of W ill which holds th a t  u n ity
of w il l  i s  th e  foundation of a N ation. This 
view was held  by Renan.
e) The Theory of P e rso n a lity  which holds th a t  
th e  n a tio n  i s  a moral p e rso n a lity  which has 
th e  r ig h t  to  a f re e  development.
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This was a view common to  many French th in k e rs  
on th e  s u b je c t, one of i t s  proponents being 
Boutroux. v28)
The above enumeration w i l l  give a b r ie f ,  but com plete, 
o u tlin e  o f th e  various phases th a t  the N a tio n a lis t ic  o r  th e  
S t a t i s t  Philosophy w il l  ta k e , and i s  o f importance to  th e  
philosopher o f pedagogy because the  fo rm ation  of a n a tio n  
w il l  have id e n t ic a l  causes w ith  th e  deepening o f n a tio n a l 
s p i r i t ,  and the  aim o f the  educator in  th e  Philosophy o f 
N ationalism  w i l l  be to  s treng then  the  n a tio n a l s p i r i t  in  
each sub jec t o f education . The danger in  t h i s  approach 
i s  apparen t. The su b jec t o f  educationL is no t th e  c i t iz e n  
of t h i s  o r th a t  coun try , nor o f t h i s  o r th a t  se c tio n  of 
any country . The su b jec t o f education  i s  a  man in  th e
f u l l  sense o f th e  word, w ith a l l  h is  f a c u l t ie s ,  and i t  i s
as a man th a t  he must be educated . I t  i s  tru e  th a t  each 
man i s  the c i t iz e n  o f some p a r t ic u la r  country and partakes 
o f the  c u ltu re  o f th a t  country , bu t any attem pt to  make 
th e  country  and the  p a r t ic u la r  circum stances of time and 
p lace th e  norms o f education  i s  to  n eg lec t the whole no tion  
of education .
I t  i s  obvious to  us now th a t  th e  supremacy o f th e  s ta te
o r the n a tio n  i n i t s  c ru d est form, as expressed in  th e  p h ilo ­
sophy o f Nazi Germany o r F a sc is t I t a ly  can lead  to  th e  most 
inhuman ex cesses. Indeed, i t  was apparent long before our
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tim e to  th in k in g  men. One of th e  f i r s t  to  recognize th e  
e v i ls  in h eren t in  t h i s  theory  was the  German educational 
philosopher J .  Langbehn (1851-1907) who published h is  
Rembrandt a ls  E rze ih er in  1890, th e  s ix t ie th  e d it io n  of 
which appeared in  1923, H irsc h f ie ld , L eipz ig ; and in  th i s  
book i s  a complete c r i t ic is m  o f th e  id eas  of th e  N ational­
i s t  and S t a t i s t  p h ilo so p h ers . He sums up th e  noxious re ­
s u l t s  of th i s  th eo iy  in  the fo llow ing  words:
"The in te rn a l  forum was s a c r if ic e d  to  th e  e x te rn a l; 
th e  so u l to  th e  body; conscience to  science; man 
to  theGerman; v ir tu e  to  a c tio n ; th e  C h ris tian  to  
th e  c i t iz e n ;  p e rso n a lity  to  o rg an iza tio n ; c iv i l i z a ­
t io n  to  a c u ltu re ;  education  to  in s tru c t io n ;  l i f e  
to  th e  school and C h ris t to  C esa r." (29)
This i s  indeed a sca th ing  ind ic tm en t, and when we con­
s id e r  th a t  th i s  indictm ent was w ritte n  a t  a time when most 
o f the world was p ra is in g  the  German system o f education  
and our schools and u n iv e r s i t ie s  were ig n o ran tly  aping th e  
German way we are  perhaps amazed a t  th e  in s ig h t o f Lang­
behn. I f  we leav e  out th e  small phrase "man to  th e  German" 
and s u b s t i tu te  th e  name of many another country , th e  in d ic t ­
ment holds good o f many co u n tr ie s  today , and we, even here 
in  Canada,could stand a good exam ination o f conscience on 
th e  su b je c t. But Langbehn was not th e  only one, no r was 
he th e  g rea te s  in  th e  educa tio n a l f ie ld  to  r e a l i z e  th e  
dangers in  the  systems o f th e  p ro ta g o n is ts  o f N ationalism . 
The name th a t  s tan d s  out in  opposition  to  them i s  th a t  o f
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Dr. F.W. P o e rs te r . He was born in  1869 and stu d ied  in  
B erlin  and in  F ribourg . In  1896 he spent some tim e in  
p riso n  as a r e s u l t  o f  h is  daring to  c r i t i c i z e  th e  Emperor.
He then  l e f t  the  country  and s tu d ied  in  Sw itzerland., Eng­
land  and America. In  1904 he published  h is  f i r s t  book 
Jungendlehre. He taugh t fo r  some time in  Vienna and l a t e r  
(1913) was made P ro fesso r o f Philosophy and Pedagogy a t 
Munich. But he was forced to  r e t i r e  in  1916 because o f 
h is  c r i t ic is m  of th e  education system . He r e t i r e d  to  
Sw itzerland only to  be rec a lled  a f t e r  th e  d e fea t o f Germany 
to  take the p o s itio n  of Ambassador o f Bavaria to  Berne in  
1919. He moved permanently to  Lucerne in  1919. Among h is  
genera l works one of p a r t ic u la r  i n t e r e s t ,  because o f i t s  
t i t l e ,  as w ell as i t s  co n ten t, was Mein Kampf gegen das 
N a tio n a lis tic h e  und M il i ta r is t is c h e  D eustschland. I f  th e  
thoughts in  t h i s  book had been s tu d ied , th e  l a t e r  and more 
no to rious Mein Kampf would have been r id ic u le d  a t  i t s  source 
as i t  should have been.
His works on Pedagogy are  the  follow ing:
a) General Works:
1 . Jugendlhere (1904)
2 . Lebenskunde (1911)
3 . Erzeihung und Belbsterzeihung (1917)
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b) S pecia l Works:
1 . Schule und C harakter
2. P o li t is c h e  E thik  und P o litisc h e  Padagogik
3 . S exualeth ik  und Sexualpadagogik
4 . Schule und Suhne
5. Lebensfuhrung
7 . Bedenken gegen d ie  E inheitsschu le
S. C hristu s  und das Menschliche Leben
9. R elig ion  und Charakterbildung
In  the course o f th e se  works he s e ts  fo r th  a philosophy
of education  which i s  complete in  most m a tte rs . He tak es
as th e  sub jec t o f  education man as he i s .  The aim of h is
work i s  a complete and in te g ra te d  program of education . He
d iscu sses th e  d o c trin e s  of the N a tio n a lis ts  and f in d s  t h e i r
e r ro rs  re v o ltin g . For him, a l l  th e  problems o f  c u ltu re  are
problems of education:
w. . . to u s  le s  problemes de l a  c u ltu re  so n t, dans (3 0 ) 
le u r  rac in es  profondes, des problemes d 1education ."
And h is  views on so c ia l education a re  expressed in  th e  
follow ing:
"L*education so c ia l l a  p lus e ff ic a c e  ne se trouve 
pas dans 1 *ad ap ta tio n  a l a  v ie  s o c ia ls ,  mais dans 
l a  trempe du e a ra c te re  personnel con tre  l a  p ress io n  
des m a jo rlte s , con tre  l a  ty ra n n ie  de I 1egoisms v
c o l l e c t i f ,  con tre  l 'i v r e s s e  des passions n a tio n a ls ."
The importance of F o e rs te r  i s  t h a t  he was th e  f i r s t  
to  r a is e  a loud voice in  p ro te s t ag a in st th e  e v i ls  o f a 
N a tio n a lis t and S t a t i s t  Philosophy of Education. One may 
be tempted to  wonder a t  the spaee and time given to  him in  
t h i s  work, bu t th e  reason should be c le a r .  He was a voice
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th a t  was ra ised  in  p ro te s t  long before th e  e v i l  f r u i t s  
of th e  system he condemned were apparent to  the  w orld, 
and the  p ro te s t he ra ised  should be r a is e d  in  any country 
a g a in s t th e  exaggerated claim s of any s ta te  to  th e  prime 
lo y a lty  o f th e  person . This may sound l ik e  tre a so n  b u t, 
on sober thought i t  i s  th e  only way o f safeguarding human 
be ings. And th e  w elfare of human beings must be th e  prime 
aim of any educator o r ph ilosopher o f education .
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CHAPTER I I I
In  th e  f i r s t  se c tio n  some tim e was spent in  the  
co n sid e ra tio n  o f th e  c h ie f  schools of thought th a t  are  
cu rren t in  modern trea tm en ts  o f a  pedagogical philosophy.
Those th re e  schools o f thought were chosen because they  
are a summing up of basic  e r ro rs  which are  found in  to d a y 's  
pedagogy. I  am not making the  statem ent th a t  th ese  e r ro rs  
w i l l  be found expressed in  e x ac tly  th e  same words which I  
have used to  describe  them. Nor am I  making th e  a s se r tio n  
th a t  these  id eas  w il l  be found in  t h e i r  pure form in  any 
of th e  p resen t day pedagogical e x p e r ts . But I  am making 
the  statem ent th a t  these  are  th e  basic  e r ro r s ,  and th a t  
e r ro r  found in  modem philosophy w i l l  be reduceable to  some, 
o r to  one, of th e  above-mentioned schools.
The th re e  schools which were proposed fo r  co n sid e ra tio n  
were th e  N a tu ra l is t ,  th e  R a d ic a l-S o c ia lis t  and the N a tio n a lis t ,  
o r S t a t i s t ,  and th e  observation  was made th a t  th e i r  p h ilo ­
sophies o f  education flowed from th e i r  ph ilosoph ies of l i f e .
An attem pt was made to  po in t out th e  basic  p h ilo so p h ica l 
p o s itio n  of each schoo l, and to  in d ic a te  th e  e r ro r  in  th a t  
p o s it io n . The N a tu ra lis ts  were found to  hold to  a merely 
m a te r ia l i s t ic  w orld . The R a d ic a l-S o c ia lis ts  were found to  
hold to  th e  p o s itio n  th a t  goodness was measured u t i l i t y ,
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th a t  t r u th  was only  a sc e rta in a b le  by in d u c tio n , and th a t  
man had h is  p o s itio n  only as a member of so c ie ty  and was 
subordinated to  t h i s  so c ie ty . The N a tio n a lis ts  hold the  
p o s itio n  which m ain ta in s, along w ith th e  above-mentioned 
p o s itio n  o f th e  R a d ie a l-S o c ia lis ts ,  th a t  th e  concrete  so­
c ie ty  o f which man i s  merely a subord inate  p a r t  i s  some de­
f in i t e  s ta te  or n a tio n .
By statem ent th e se  p o s itio n s  were reprobated as being 
erroneous, and the  b a s is  fo r  th e  rep ro b a tio n  was th a t  they  
were one-sided , p a r t i a l ,  l im ite d , th a t  th ey  did  not take 
in to  co n sid e ra tio n  the t o t a l i t y  o f r e a l i t y ,  and th a t  both 
th e  su b jec t o f t h e i r  ed u ca tio n a l th e o r ie s ,  the  aims o f t h e i r  
educational p ra c tic e  and th e  m atter o f t h e i r  education was 
f a l s e ,  not in  th e  sense of an abso lu te  fa lsehood , fo r  th e re  
i s  no such th in g  as complete fa lsehood , bu t f a ls e  in  the 
sense th a t  they neg lected  some t r u th ,  or th a t  they s tre sse d  
some po in t o f t r u th  to  th e  detrim en t o f th e  whole t r u th .
The im p lica tio n s  of th i s  p o s itio n  a re  obvious. I f  
previous p o s itio n s  are  re je c te d  because they  do not give 
the whole t r u th ,  then a p o s itio n  must be o ffe red  which does 
give the  whole t ru th  and which o f fe rs  a complete s e t of 
p r in c ip le s  which w il l  serve as a b a s is  fo r  a philosophy of 
l i f e  and,by consequence, as th e  b a s is  fo r  a philosophy of 
education . The question  th e re  posed i s  where we a re  to
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seek fo r  a  philosophy o f l i f e  th a t  w i l l  be com plete, th a t  
w i l l  cover every phase of human l i f e ,  v eg e tab le , anim al, 
in t e l l e c tu a l ,  s p i r i tu a l  and emotional * And th e  obvious ans­
wer, which may sound a b i t  f l ip p a n t ,  i s  th a t  th e  only  p h ilo ­
sophy th a t  embraces the t o t a l i t y  o f l i f e  i s  to  be found in  
the  philosophy th a t  men down through th e  ages have developed 
to  meet a l l  the  demands of o b se rv a tio n , experience and though^* 
In  b r i e f ,  i t  i s  only  in  the philosophy of R ea lity  th a t  such 
a complete system w il l  be found. And th a t  philosophy of 
r e a l i ty  i s  th e  c la s s ic a l  philosophy of the  anc ien t Greeks, 
not the idealism  of a P la to , no t th e  in te l le c tu a l is m  of a 
S o cra tes , c e r ta in ly  no t in  th e  mere phenomenalism of 
Parmenides, and c e r ta in ly  not in  th e  d en ia l of wisdom of 
th e  s k e p tic s ,  but in  the  rea lism  of th e  g re a te s t  o f the 
G reeks, A ris to tle*  The reason fo r choosing A r is to tle  as 
the source o f ph ilosophic in s p ir a t io n  i s  th a t  he was th e  
f i r s t  to  give ph ilosophic  exp lanation  to  the b a s ic  problems 
th a t  were tro u b lin g  th e  minds of the  th in k ers#  To re a l iz e  
th e  impact o f A r is to te lia n  thought on the in te l l e c tu a l  
world i t  i s  necessary  to  bear in  mind th a t  r e a l i s t i c  
philosophers are  seek ing , not an id e a l  system o f thought, 
but a system of thought th a t  w il l  make understandable th e  
r e a l i t i e s  w ith which' man i s  faced . The constan t problems 
of r e a l i ty  a re  always w ith u s , th e  mind i s  always confronted
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w ith r e a l i t i e s  in  the world th a t  demand ex p lan a tio n . The 
problem presen ted  by permanence and change i s  one th a t  had 
confronted th in k e rs  from the beginning o f recorded though t.
What i s  th ere  in  r e a l i ty  th a t  i s  resp o n sib le  fo r  change 
and how can change be explained  i f  th e re  i s  to  be any per­
manence? The problem o f th e  v a l id i ty  o f u n iv e rsa l concepts 
of knowledge was another o f th e  key problems. Was th e re  
any v a l id i ty  in  th e  p re d ic a tio n  of a term  derived  from one 
in d iv id u a l to  another in d iv id u a l o f th e  same sp e c ie s , and 
an a l l ie d  problem, was th e re  any v a l id i ty  a t  a l l  in  th e  app lica­
t io n  o f tran scen d en ta l term s to  the  h igher term  of th e  r e la ­
tio n sh ip ?  A ll these  problems were se t fo r th  by A r is to tle  
and he o ffe red  a so lu tio n  th a t  i s  a t  the ro o t o f the  c l a s s i ­
c a l school o f m etaphysics. The force and th e  c l a r i ty  o f h is  
thought are  as g rea t t  oday as they  were in  th e  days when he 
enunciated the rev o lu tio n a ry  id eas  o f h is  m etaphysics. The 
f i r s t  o f th ese  id eas  was the Theory of Hylomorphism, th e  
d o ctrin e  o f  m atte r and form, and by th i s  c le a r  d o c trin e  he 
made p o ssib le  the  exp lanation  o f  f lu x  and permanence in  th e  
w orld. The d o c trin e  of m a tte r  and form was enlarged to  th e  
la rg e r  and s t i l l  more f r u i t f u l  D octrine o f Act and Potency 
which made f lu x  and permanence understandable in  a l l  th in g s  
in  which they  e x is te d . His D octrine on th e  Nature of of 
U n iv ersa ls , th a t  th ey  e x is t  in  our minds as u n iv e rsa l con­
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c e p ts , corresponding to  r e a l i t i e s  in  n a tu re , but in  th in g s  
ou tside  th e  mind, u n iv e rsa ls  e x i s t ,  not as u n iv e rsa ls  bu t in  
concrete in d iv id u a ls . T h is  statem ent o f th e  p o s it io n , l a t e r  
c a lle d  th a t  of moderate rea lism , i s  th e  one ep istom olog ically  
th a t  s a t i s f i e s  th e  demands of r e a l i ty  and o f the  human in ­
te l l ig e n c e .  And, in  answer to  the v a l id i ty  o f p red ica tio n  
o f a tran scen d en ta l term  to  the  h igher term of a r e la t io n ­
sh ip , he form ulated fo r  us the r ic h  and profound Doctrine o f 
th e  Analogy o f Being, w ith  th e  consequent Analogy of P red ica­
t io n .  In  f in e ,  A r is to tle  gave th e  answers to  th e  fundamen­
t a l  problems o f philosophy, answers th a t  were and are  in  keep­
ing  w ith th e  demands of reason and r e a l i ty .  I t  i s  fo r  th e  
above reasons th a t  A r is to t le  i s  tak en  as the  s ta r t in g  po in t 
fo r  th e  philosophy th a t  w i l l  supply a philosophy o f l i f e  
and education .
I  sa id  above th a t  A r is to tle  w i l l  be taken as th e  s t a r t ­
ing po in t o f a philosophy o f l i f e  and education , because i t  
would be q u ite  opposed to  the  honesty o f anyone in  search 
of t r u t h ,  and in c id e n tly  to  th e  s p i r i t  o f A r is to t le ,  to  be 
s a t i s f ie d  w ith rep ea tin g  th e  t r u th  enunciated by th e  ancien t 
Greek w ithout tak in g  in to  account th e  development th a t  h is  
philosophy has undergone down through the  ages. In  b r ie f ,  
we cannot neg lec t th e  commentators a n A ris to tle , and e s p e c ia lly , 
fo r  us of the w estern w orld, we cannot n eg lec t the  g re a te s t  of
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a l l  th e  commentators on A r is to t le ,  th e  g re a te s t  ph ilosopher 
th a t  th e  world has ever known, Thomas Aquinas. I  want to  
po in t out q u ite  c le a r ly  th a t  here we are  t r e a t in g  Thomas as 
a ph ilo sopher, no t as a th eo lo g ian , and th a t  we are  follow ­
ing  him in  th i s  philosophy by th e  l ig h t  o f in te l l ig e n c e .  We 
are  making an a b s tra c tio n  from him as a th eo lo g ian , though 
i t  w i l l  be pointed out l a t e r  th a t  i t  i s  im possible to  have 
merely a philosophy of education , one must a lso  have a theology 
of education . And th i s  should be borne in  mind, because, 
though we may omit mention o f th e  th e o lo g ic a l im p lica tions 
of th e  m atters we m ention, we are  always conscious of them, 
fo r  i t  i s  im p o ss ib le ,if  we are  to  be o b jec tiv e  in  our t r e a t ­
ment o f problems, to  n eg lec t such a p a ten t and g la rin g  r e a l i ty  
as r e l ig io n ,  o r to  b lin d  o u rse lv es , through p re ju d ice  o r m alice 
to  the  o b jec tiv e  t ru th s  of r e l ig io n .
There i s  only one sm all work o f Thomas Aquinas which deals  
ex p ressly  w ith  the  philosophy o f education , and th a t  i s  h is  
b r ie f  t r a c t  De M agistro which i s  a copy o f a s c h o la s tic  d ispu ta­
t io n  which was held  a t  th e  U n iv e rsity  o f P a ris  about th e  y ear 
(1 )1257. But th e  whole of him* immense work i s  a philosophy o f 
l i f e  and an almost e x p l ic i t  philosophy o f  education because 
he w rote as a te ac h e r , and in  th e  a r t ic u la t io n  of each se c tio n  
of h is  monumental work th e  aim s, procedure, means and technique 
o f h is  teach in g  are  to  be c le a r ly  seen . This i s  pointed out
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h e re , because though the  read er may gain a g re a t d e a l from 
read ing  th e  sec tio n  De M agistro and a b r ie f  summary o f the  
conclusions o f th a t  work w i l l  be given in  t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  most 
of the q uo ta tions th a t  w i l l  be used in  the  next sec tio n s  o f 
t h i s  paper w ill  be taken from th e  more commonly read works 
o f th e  Ph ilosopher, th e  two Suramae. and th e  de V e r i ta te .
R e a lis t ic  education  comprises two e s s e n tia l  elem ents, 
the  m etaphysical and th e  p sy ch o lo g ica l, o r ,  in  more simple 
term s, a philosophy o f education  i s  concerned w ith th e  o b je c t­
ive  t r u th ,  and w ith the su b je c tiv e  development o f th e  t r u th -  
seeking person . The reason fo r  t h i s  i s  th a t  man, th e  person 
to  be educated, must develop in  h im self th e  su b jec tiv e  elem ents, 
th a t  i s  th e  in te l l e c tu a l  and th e  moral v i r tu e s ,  and i f  th i s  
development i s  not to  be in  a  vacuum, th e re  must be a c le a r  
in te g ra tio n  o f th i s  su b jec tiv e  development w ith th e  world of 
r e a l i ty ,  w ith o b jec tiv e  t r u th .  The plan  th a t  w i l l  be followed 
in  th e  succeeding pages w il l  be the  n a tu ra l o u tlin in g  of the 
o b jec tiv e  t r u th s ,  f i r s t  those t r u th s  idiich form the m etaphysical 
base o f philosophy, then those  tru th s  which form the  base o f 
a sound psychology, and second, an account o f  the sub jec tiv e  
development o f the  in te l l e c tu a l  and moral v ir tu e s  in  the person 
educated*
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P a rt One; The F i r s t  E sse n tia l Element of Pedagogy;
O bjective Truth
The horizon o f education i s  lim ite d  only by th e  cap ac ity  
o f man's mind to  come in  co n tac t with the  r e a l i t i e s  o f being .
I f  one be a lo v e r o f wisdom, the  e n t i re  range of being must 
be the f ie ld  o f h is  endeavours in  in te l le c tu a l  e f f o r t s .  I t  
i s  c le a r  then th a t  mere f a c ts  cannot be c la s s i f ie d  as educa­
t io n  and the necessary  consequence o f t h i s  i s  th a t  o rder i s  
necessary  fo r  a proper knowledge of th in g s .  The r e la t io n ­
sh ip  o f th in g s  must be e s ta b lish e d . In d iv id u a l f a c t s ,  
s c ie n t i f i c  o b se rv a tio n s , experiences must be inco rpo rated  
in to  th e  body of knowledge. These u n its  of knowledge be­
come v i ta l iz e d  and p a r t o f the l iv in g  body o f t r u th  only 
when each f a c t ,  each o b se rv a tio n , each experience i s  seen 
to  have i t s  s ig n ifican ce  in  re sp e c t to  the w hole. The 
e s s e n t ia l  p roperty  o f the  educated man i s  to  see, perceive 
every th ing  in  th e  l ig h t  o f fundamental id e a s . For th e  
e s s e n tia l  of o rder i s  the establishm ent o f u n ity  in  m u lti­
p l i c i t y ,  F actual knowledge, i f  i s o la te d  i s  s t e r i l e  and b arren , 
but i f  i t  i s  seen in  proper re la tio n s h ip  to  every th ing  th a t  
i s ,  i t  becomes f e r t i l e  and p roductive , and the  f r u i t  of i t s  
p ro d u c tiv ity  i s  wisdom. There a re  c e r ta in  d e f in ite  o b jec tiv e  
tru th s  which form th e  b a s is  and un ify in g  p r in c ip le  o f a l l
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knowledge, and we w i l l  proceed w ith  an exam ination, necess­
a r i ly  b r i e f ,  o f th ese  t r u th s  as they  are s e t fo r th  fo r  us 
in  th e  philosophy o f Thomas Aquinas*
The f i r s t  o f th e se  o b je c tiv e  t r u th s  i s  th e  o b je c t iv i ty  
of human though t* The maning o f t h i s  t r u th  i s  th a t  human 
thought i s  measured by o b jec tiv e  r e a l i t y .  The manner in
which Thomas Aquinas exp la in s the o b jec tiv e  o f thought i s
(2)
to  be found in  th e  Surama; Theologica where the  question
i s  asked:
"Utrum sp ec ies  i n t e l l i g i b i l i s  a phantasmatibus 
a b s tra c tae  se habeant ad in te lle c tu m  nstrum , s ic u t 
id  quod i n t e l l i g i t u r . "
and, in  the  response to  th i s  q u es tio n , he g ives us th e  
d o c trin e  which exp la in s the  re la t io n s h ip  between th e  in ­
t e l l i g i b l e  species in  th e  mind and th e  o b je c t o f our know­
led g e . The in t e l l i g ib l e  sp e c ie s , th e  su b jec tiv e  im press­
io n s  and determ inations of our i n t e l l e c t  are not th e  d i ­
r e c t  o b jec ts  o f th o u g h t. They are the means by which we 
are  le a d  to  the d i r e c t  knowledge of o b jec tiv e  r e a l i t y .
One of the  most modern commentators of Aquinas, J .  M arita in ,
, , (3)in  h is  Annexe 'a' o f h is  book Les Degres du S av o ir, exp la in s 
c le a r ly  what i s  meant by th e  natu re  of a sign  and s ta te s  
th a t  th e  species i n t e l l i g i b i l i s  i s  not th e  "objeetum quod1* 
o f knowledge but the  "objeetum quo11. The whole o f th is  appen­
d ix  w il l  repay c a re fu l study. The thing; of which we are
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p rim arily  aware in  th e  process o f knowledge i s  not th e  con­
cep t o f a th in g , bu t th e  e x te rn a l o b jec t of which th e  species 
i s  merely the mental s ig n . The species expressa in  th e  ac t 
<8# knowledge has a r e la t io n  o f id e n t i ty  w ith th e  o b je c t;  i t  
i s  th e  in te n tio n a l presence of the th in g  in  the  mind* The 
metaphysic behind th i s  i s  th e  f a c t  th a t  im m ate ria lity  i s  
th e  ro o t o f a l l  co g n itio n , both in  th e  a c tiv e  and th e  passive 
sense , th a t  i s  to  say , both th e  su b jec t knowing and th e  th in g  
known have th e i r  re sp ec tiv e  p a r ts  in  th e  process o f c o g n itio n  
only in  as nnich as they  are  im m ateria l, only in  as much as 
they  are  form al, in  as much as they  are  in  a c t .  A very
e x ce llen t expose of t h i s  t ru th  w i l l  be found in  Jos* G redt1 s
(4)
Elements P h ilo soph iae . on im m ate ria lity  as the  ro o t o f cogni­
t io n .  The r e la t io n s  of the con ten t o f our a c t o f thought 
to  r e a l i ty  co n s is ts  in  th e  t ru th  of our knowledge. Thomas 
c a re fu lly  d is tin g u ish e s  th re e  asp ec ts  of t r u th ,  a l l  d i s t i n c t ,  
but a l l  in terdependen t. The f i r s t  t r u th  i s  m etaphysical 
t r u th ,  which c o n s is ts  in  conform ity of th in g s  to  the i n t e l l i ­
gence o f the f i r s t  cause, and in  t h i s  sense everth ing  can be 
said  to  be t r u e .  The second type of t r u th  i s  c a lle d  psychologi­
c a l t ru th  and co n s is ts  in  conform ity of the  dependent i n t e l l i ­
gence to  the o b jec t of the a c t  of in te l l e c t io n ,  and i t  i s  in
th i s  sense th a t  th e  above statem ent i s  to  be understood. In
th i s  second case th e re  i s ,  p e r s e . no fa lsehood , though per
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aecidens falsehood may a r is e  from psycho-somatic cau ses.
The th i rd  type o f t ru th  i s  c a lle d  lo g ic a l  o r moral t r u th ,  
and th i s  c o n s is ts  in  a conform ity o f th e  m an ifesta tio n s  o f 
in te l l ig e n c e  w ith  the  in te l l ig e n c e  i t s e l f .  In  t h i s  case 
th e re  i s  a d i s t in c t  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  e r ro r  because of th e  
weakness o r th e  m alice o f dependent beings. The n a tu re  
of t h i s  t r u th ,  th e  psychological t r u th  mentioned as the 
second t ru th  above, does no t presuppose a mechanical sim i­
l a r i t y  between th e  manner o f knowing and the  manner of 
being of the o b jec t known. The manner o f b e in g , or mode, 
o f  the  o b jec t in  th e  mind i s  im m ateria l, in te n t io n a l ,  
w hile th e  mode o f being of th e  o b jec t remains ex ac tly
what i t  i s  in  i t s e l f .  This i s  proven by Aquinas in  th e  
(5)
Summa Theologies. In  th e  last-m en tioned  a r t i c l e  he says 
d e a r l y  i -
'i.quod o p o rte t re s  in te l l e e ta s  hoc modo in  s e ip s is  
s u b s is te re , s c i l i c e t  im m a te ria lite r  e t  im m obilite r.
Hoc autem necessarium  non e s t ,  q u i a . . . . "
and he proceeds to  give h is  reasons. While knowledge i s
(6)
derived  from experience, as he shows, th e  i n t e l l e c t  knows
(7)
th in g s  according to  i t s  own n a tu re . I t  i s  then  c le a r  
from th e  teach ing  o f Aquinas th a t  human though t, because 
of the  natu re  of th o u g h t, the n a tu re  of th e  knowing su b jec t 
and the  na tu re  o f th e  thought p ro cess , i s  measured, l im ite d , 
defined  by the  o b jec t o f th e  process o f cognition} th a t  i s  
to  say , in  human cog n itio n  th e re  i s  to  be found o b jec tiv e
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t r u th  in  as much as the knowing su b jec t i s  informed by 
th e  o b jec t o f  the  process o f co g n itio n , which i s  not 
any su b jec tiv e  phantasm, bu t the o b je c t i t s e l f *
The second t ru th  which we are  going to  consider 
i s  th e  meaning of being . The term  th a t  i s  used in  th e  
L atin  te x t  i s  th a t  o f "ens" and to  the  beginner in  meta­
physics i t  i s  ap t to  p resen t d i f f i c u l t i e s .  But th e  Eng­
l i s h  rendering  of th e  word as "Being” , understood in  th e  
sense o f anything th a t  has a  n a tu re , e i th e r  a c tu a lly  e x i s t ­
ing o r capable o f e x is t in g ,  makes the  concept q u ite  c le a r  
fo r  u s . The d i f f i c u l ty  th a t  a r is e s  i s  t h i s :  Being i s
something th a t  cannot be lim ite d  to  any d e f in i te  category , 
no r can the concept o f being  be made p rec ise  w ithout a t 
once l im itin g  the  concept o f being in  general to  a 
p a r t ic u la r  c la s s  o f b e in g s . I t  i s  t h i s  q u a li ty  o f being 
in  general th a t  gives occasion to  th e  proponents of the  
school o f thought which holds th a t  m an's in te l l ig e n c e  i s  
th e  measure o f th in g s  and th a t  c le a r  and d i s t in c t  ideas 
o f th in g s  are th e  only source of knowledge, to  proclaim  
th a t  being i s  so vague and in d e f in i te  as to  be a u se le ss  
concept. But here p re c ise ly  i s  the  im portant p o in t o f 
th e  A risto te lian -T h o m istie  concept of b e ing . Because th e  
concept i s  no t l im ite d , i t  enab les th e  mind to  embrace a l l  
r e a l i ty  in  one grand sy n th esis  and to  b u ild  what i s  r e a l ly
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a m etaphysic, th a t  i s ,  a complete s tru c tu re  o f knowledge 
th a t  r i s e s  above th e  l im ita tio n s  of m atter and embraces 
a l l  r e a l i t y .  The prime in tu i t io n  of human in te ll ig e n c e  
i s  th a t  o f b e in g , simply the  th in g n ess  of a th in g , and 
i t  i s  necessary  th a t  we acquire  a l l  our o th e r concepts 
by ad d itio n  to  the  prime concept o f b e in g . The f a c t  th a t  
th i s  concept i s  tra n sc e n d e n ta l, t h a t , i s  not lim ite d  to  any 
d iv is io n  of b e in g , i s  o f paramount im portance. I t  was 
mentioned above th a t  one o f th e  most f r u i t f u l  co n trib u ­
t io n s  tof A r is to tle  to  th e  study o f  philosophy was h is  
co n trib u tio n  to  th e  c la r i f i c a t io n  of th e  D octrine of 
Analogy, The core o f t h i s  d o c trin e  i s  the  fa c t  th a t  a l l  
beings have t h e i r  being in  common, no m atte r how v aried  
they  may be. And th i s  p o in t i s  expressed in  more tech n i­
c a l language when i t  i s  sa id  th a t  though th in g s  are  simply 
d if f e re n t  ( s im p lie i te r  d iv e rsa ) n ev e rth le ss  they  are in  a 
c e r ta in  way ( secundum quid) a lik e  o r th e  same. In  th e  
concrete a p p lic a tio n  of t h i s  d o c tr in e , the  f a c t  th a t  th in g s  
are  simply d iv e rse  leaves us w ithout any means of knowledge 
of them un less  they  come Tinder th e  observation  of our minds, 
but the  f a c t  th a t  they  a re  secundum q u id , the  same, i s  th e  
b a s is  f o r  our an a lo g ica l knowledge of them, * The knowledge 
th a t  i s  ob tained  by analogy i s  r e a l  knowledge of the th in g s  
under a c e r ta in  a sp e c t; in  th e  case o f the concept o f being
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i t  i s  th e  aspect o f  b e in g . Other r e a l i t i e s  o f  which know­
ledge may be had are  u n ity ,  t r u th ,  goodness and, by analyz­
ing  the  secundum quid  sameness we can g e t a t r u e ,  though lim i­
te d ,  knowledge of many th in g s  th a t  transcend  our knowledge 
of many th in g s  th a t  ranscend our knowledge of th e  essences 
o f m a te r ia l th in g s . The n e c e s s ity  o f a thorough grasp of 
the  nature o f an a lo g ica l being and an a lo g ica l knowledge i s  
apparent from th e  f a c t  th a t  knowledge i s  th e  science o f 
th in g s , th a t  i s ,  th e  scienee o f b e in g , and i f  we are  not 
to  tru n c a te  our knowledge and l im i t  i t  to  p a r t  o f i t s  
proper o b je c t, we must have a firm  and adequate g rasp  o f 
th e  n a tu re  o f an a lo g ica l knowledge. Hie b e s t sources o f 
a comprehensive knowledge of t h i s  d o c trin e  w il l  be C aje tan l s 
De Ente e t  E ssen tia  which i s  a very  complete t r e a t i s e  on 
th e  su b je c t, though a  b i t  d i f f i c u l t  in  s ty le ,  a s e r ie s  o f 
a r t i c le s  in  the  review  S cienzia  Thomista o f 1928-29 en­
t i t l e d  D octrina A ris to te lica -T h o m istica  de Analogia. and 
a s e r ie s  o f a r t i c le s  in  the  review  Divus Thomas o f 1925 
de n a tu ra  analog ia  which give a  comprehensive o u tlin e  o f 
th e  r e la t io n  o f analogy to  c a u s a li ty , and th e  in terdepen­
dence o f  the various types o f an a lo g ica l being as  the  ro o t
o f an a lo g ica l p re d ic a tio n . M. M arita in  in  Les Degres du
(8)
Savoir gives a good summary o f th e  teach in g .
But o f course our knowledge i s  not l im ite d  to  an a lo g ica l 
knowledge. A nalogical knowledge i s  th e  con tac t th a t  we have
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w ith r e a l i t i e s  which transcend  our immediate experiences* 
I n te l le c tu a l  knowledge p en e tra te s  th e  very essence of 
m a te ria l th in g s  and makes th e  knowing su b jec t th e  possess­
o r o f th a t  very essen ce . But in  th e  cases where th e  e ss ­
ence of th in g s  i s  beyond th e  grasp  o f a dependent i n t e l l i ­
gence, we are  dependent on analogy fo r th e  m etaphysical 
p r in c ip le s  which w i l l  make our knowledge of f a c ts  a r e a l  
sc ien ce . I n te l le c tu a l  knowledge th e n , p en e tra te s  th e  e ss ­
ence of th in g s  and im p lies  a  profound grasp  o f th e  very
reason o f being in  th in g s . This i s  brought out fcy Aquinas
(9)
in  Srinrna Theologica where he teach es  th e  na tu re  o f th e
a c tiv e  i n t e l l e c t .  He says
n . . . e t  in te l le c to s  n o s tro s  ad hoc, quod de g e n e r i-  
bus, e t  speciebus rerum sc ien tiam  h ab e ren t.”
The c le a r  and obvious dependence of knowledge on th e  p r in c i­
p le s  o f being can be seen when we consider th a t  being would 
not be a tta in e d  by knowing i f  knowing did  not a lread y  be­
long to  the  o rder o f b e in g . And th e  most p e rfe c t union o f 
in te l l ig e n c e  w ith a l l  be in g  i s  by knowledge, fo r  knowledge 
gives th e  p e rfe c t and in tim a te  union th a t  r e s u l t s  from the
re la tio n s h ip  o f id e n t i ty  o f th e  knowing sub jec t w ith th e
00
o b jec t known in  th e  in te n tio n a l  manner.
The opposition  th a t  t h i s  d o c trin e  g ives to  th e  th e o r ie s  
o f N aturalism  and R adical-S ocialism  i s  a lready  pronounced. 
The f a c t  th a t  knowledge cannot be l imited  to  observable
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f a c t s ,  and s t i l l  l e s s  to  ind u c tiv e  reasoning  i s  a death  
blow to  th e  fundamental id ea  o f th e  N a tu ra lis t  School,
The teach ing  o f Aquinas on th e  tra n scen d en ta l n a tu re  o f 
being , o f t r u th ,  goodness and u n ity  makes th e  Pragmatism 
of th e  R a d ic a l-S o c ia lis ts  an o b s tac le  to  knowledge r a th e r  
than  a norm and a s tandard . The inadequacy of th ese  
th e o r ie s  i s  apparent in  the l ig h t  o f th e  fu ln ess  o f these  
prime m etaphysical t r u th s ,  and w ill  become more apparent 
l a t e r  when the  n a tu re  o f man and h is  ac tio n s  are considered .
The th i r d  t ru th  th a t  we are  going to  consider i s  a 
consequence of the second t r u th ,  and may be expressed as 
the t r u th  of th e  source o f b e in g . In  th e  l a s t  few pages 
reference  has been freq u e n tly  made to  dependent b e ings, 
and th e  con tex t made c le a r  ju s t  what dependent being was.
I t  was shown th a t  human in te l l ig e n c e  was lim ite d  and mea­
sured by be ing , i t  was shown th a t  human knowledge cannot 
embrace th e  t o t a l i t y  of being save by an alo g ica l knowledge 
and th a t  human knowledge as w ell as human m odality  o f being 
i s  something dependent. In  o th e r words, any dependent being 
i s  one th a t  does not e x i s t  o f n e c e ss ity  but whose ex isten ce  
i s  dependent on something e ls e .  I f  we a re  no t to  lo se  our­
se lves in  th e  morass o f im agination  by t iy in g  to  p ic tu re  
an in d e f in i te  s e r ie s  o f dependencies, we w il l  see th e  ab­
so lu te  r e a l i ty  o f a necessary  being . The reasoning on th i s
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i s  c le a r# We are  sure o f th e  ex i stence of lim ite d  and 
dependent beings. T heir very  l im ita tio n  and dependence 
proves th e  ex is ten ce  o f an un lim ited  and independent being 
on whom they depend, e i th e r  rem otely o r proxim ately . The 
remoteness o r th e  proxim ity  does not make any d iffe ren ce  
but i s  only mentioned as i t  i s  one of th e  sources o f 
d i f f i c u l ty  to  th e  neophyte in  philosophy who f in d s  i t  
hard to  a b s tra c t from concrete  im aginations and th in k  in  
in te l l e c tu a l  concep ts. This partak ing  of be in g  by crea ted  
th in g s  (the  term  c rea ted  i s  not merely in s e r te d  h ere , i t  
follow s o f n e c e s s ity  from th e  dependence of l im ite d  crea­
tu r e s ,  i f  they do not e x is t  o f n e c e s s ity , they  must be 
c rea ted ) proves th a t  they have th e i r  source in  a  being th a t  
i s  no t c re a te d , th a t  i s ,  in  a being whose essence (necessary  
n a tu re ) i s  id e n t i f ie d  w ith  h is  ex is ten c e . (The personal 
pronoun here used i s  done by d esign , f o r  the  ac tu a l e x is t ­
ence of dependent in te l l e c tu a l  c re a tu re s  demands the  e x i s t ­
ence of a necessary  in t e l l e c tu a l  being , and an in te l le c tu a l
being i s  a p e rso n ). This t ru th  i s  proven by Aquinas in
(11)
th e  Summa T heologies, where he asks th e  q uestion :
*'Utrum in  Deo s i t  idem e s s e n tia  e t  e s s e .”
and in  th e  second response he says:
M.,,cum  i g i tu r  in  Deo n ih i l  s i t  p o te n tia ls ,
s e q u ite r  j sua i g i t u r  e s s e n tia  e s t  suum
esfee."
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Issu e  may be taken here w ith th e  use o f the t e r n  Deus 
o r God, but th e re  i s  no reason to  q u a rre l w ith th e  term} 
i f ,the  r e a l i ty ,  th e  independent being , w ith an id e n t i ty  
of essence and e x is te n c e , e x i s t s ,  th e  term  ap p lied  i s  
a m atte r o f in d iffe re n c e . I f  God i s  a term  th a t  some 
p re jud ice  makes men eschew, th e  symbol X may be su b s ti­
tu ted} th e  r e a l i ty  remains unchanged* In  th i s  manner, 
human thought i s  le d ,  g en tly  but d e f in i te ly ,  toward
th e  knowledge o f a supreme being and t h i s  supreme
being i s  the prime mover in  th e  o rder o f knowledge ju s t
(12)
as he i s  the prime mover in  the  o rder of being .
The o b jec t o f knowledge i s  to  arrange th e  d a te  o f a c ts  
o f cogn ition  in  p e rfe c t u n ity , to  es tim ate  th e i r  r e l a ­
tiv e  values and to  u n ite  them in  the sy n th esis  o f being . 
The end of a l l  knowledge, in  th e  n a tu ra l  order i s  a 
m etaphysical ap p rec ia tio n  o f th e  t o t a l i t y  o f be ing , up 
to  and includ ing  th e  supreme being . The in te ll ig e n c e  
knows th in g s  as they  a re , and they  a re  in  conform ity bo 
th e  in te l l ig e n c e  o f th e  supreme b e ing . This i s  what we
defined  above as m etaphysical o r o n to lo g ica l t r u th .  This
(13)
i s  t r e a te d  in  th e  Summa Theologies where Aquinas s ta te s
"V eritas  etiam  rerum e s t ,  secundum quod conforman- 
t u r  suo p r in c ip io , s c i l i c e t  i n t e l l e c tu i  d iv in o . M
The human and dependent i n t e l l e c t  i s  then capable o f know­
ing t r u th ,  and c rea ted  t r u th  as harmonized and synthesized  
in  being lead s  to  th e  knowledge o f p e rfe c t b eing where
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t r u th  in  i t s  p e rfe c tio n  has i t s  ex is te n c e . A note of 
warning must be in s e r te d .  They are  th e  product o f a 
s t r i c t l y  r a t io n a l  philosophy and are  p h ilo so p h ica l 
t r u th s .
The fo u rth  t r u th  th a t  must come under our considera­
t io n  i s  placed in  the  p o s itio n  immediately fo llow ing the 
d iscu ss io n  of t ru th s  r e la t iv e  to  th e  supreme being because 
i t  d ea ls  w ith God. This t r u th  may be s ta te d  as the  p o ss i­
b i l i t y  o f superna tu ra l t r u t h . This t ru th  w i l l  be d e a lt  
w ith  here in  a  b r ie f  manner, bu t th e re  i s  no ground fo r  
the o b jec tio n  th a t  i t  i s  th e o lo g ic a l t r u th .  The ac tu a l 
ex isten ce  of a su p ern a tu ra l t r u th ,  o r  the na tu re  o f th a t  
t r u th  i s  not th e  po in t under d iscu ss io n j what i s  being 
s ta te d  i s  simply th e  ra d ic a l  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a super­
n a tu ra l o rder o f th in g s . We have seen, th a t  th in g s  are  
because God i s .  With t h i s  knowledge comes a d e s ire  to  
know what God i s ,  bu t here philosophy i s  brought to  a 
s t a n d s t i l l .  I t  i s  tru e  th a t  by analogical p red ica tio n  
we are able to  s ta te  th a t  a l l  p e rfe c tio n s  in  t h e i r  h igh­
e s t form must e x is t  in  God, and to  deny any im perfections 
to  God. But beyond th a t  we a re  pow erless in  th e  f ie ld  
of knowledge. We have, however, th e  p o s itiv e  t r u t h  
th a t  God i s  a l l  pow erful, and th a t  th e  na tu re  of man i s  
lim ite d , so from  th ese  two t r u th s  we can draw the  very
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le g itim a te  conclusion th q t God can en large th e  capacity  
o f man in  the  realm  o f  in te l l ig e n c e ,  and in  th e  realm  
o f lo v in g , so th a t  man can have a  f u l l e r  knowledge of
(14)
God, i f  such a knowledge i s  g ran ted  by God. Our ex­
ten s io n  in  being i s  measured, not by the narrow l im its  
o f our c rea ted  power, bu t by th e  immense power o f th e  
Prime Mover. The importance of t h i s  t ru th  in  r e la t io n  
to  th e  philosophy o f education  l i e s  in  th i s :  A d iv in e
e lev a tio n  i s  p o ss ib le ; i f  th a t  d iv ine  e lev a tio n  became 
a c tu a l then th e  whole process o f education would have 
to  take  th a t  r e a l i ty  in to  co n s id e ra tio n . I t  i s  not th e  
p lace h e re , in  a  work on th e  s t r i c t l y  p h ilo so p h ica l le v e l ,  
to  prove the a c tu a l i ty  o f d iv ine  e le v a tio n , but th e  im p li­
c a tio n s  o f th a t  p o s s ib i l i ty  must be kept in  mind, and i t  
w i l l  be the duty o f th e  ph ilosopher o f pedagogy to  in v e s t i ­
gate  the  f a c ts  o f h is to ry  to  see i f  t h i s  d iv ine  e le v a tio n  
has taken p la ce , and to  form ulate h is  philosophy in  func­
t io n  o f th a t  e le v a tio n .
(On a p r a c t ic a l  le v e l  an example o f educational 
philosophers avoiding th e i r  ju s t  r  e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  
i s  to  be found in  th e  re p o rt of the Harvard Commit­
te e ,  General Education in  a Free Soeiety  where i t  
i s  s ta te d  on page 39?
“S e c ta rian , p a r t ic u la r ly  Roman C atholic 
co lle g e s  have of course t h e i r  so lu tio n , 
which was g en e ra lly  shared by American 
co lleg es  u n t i l  le s s  than  a century  ago; 
namely, the con v ic tio n  th a t  C h r is t ia n ity  
g ives meaning and u ltim a te  u n ity  to  a l l
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“p a r ts  o f th e  curriculum , indeed to  the  
whole l i f e  o f th e  c o lle g e , y e t t h i s  so lu­
tio n  i s  out o f the  q uestion  in  p u b lic ly  
supported c o lle g e s . “
The emphasis i s  m ine. There i s  no reason fo r  th i s  
so lu tio n  being out o f th e  question  on any a p r io r i  
grounds. I f  th e  Committee had sa id  th a t  th e re  was 
a grave o b lig a tio n  to  in v e s tig a te  th is  so lu tio n , 
they  would have been a c tin g  in  a reasonable manner, 
but simply to  dism iss i t  as ou t o f the q u es tio n , 
even though i t  may be t r u e ,  i s  to  be f a ls e  to  t h e i r  
pretended aim of seeking t r u th .  What they  a re  doing 
i s  seeking what they  hope to  fin d  and c lo sin g  th e i r  
minds to  o b je c tiv e  f a c t s .  The a t t i tu d e  i s  common 
enough, bu t i t  i s  shocking th a t  such an u n p h ilo - 
sophie a t t i tu d e  should be  perm itted  to  go unchallenged 
in  th e  re p o rt o f a committee which i s  supposed to  re ­
p resen t the  h ig h es t le v e l  of in te l l e c tu a l  l i f e  in  th e  
United S ta te s  of America. I t  i s  inexcusab le ,  p a r t i ­
c u la r ly  in  th e  case where the  re p o r t  i s  supposed to  be 
th e  r e s u l t  of an in v e s tig a tio n  in to  th e  p resen t condi­
t io n  of education  in  the  coun try , and i s  supposed to  
embody recommendations fo r  th e  improvement o f condi­
t io n s .  I f  t r u th  i s  no t sought by sueh a group i t  
speaks i l l  fo r  th e  fu tu re  educational l i f e  o f th e  
country and of th e  r e s t  of the w orld ).
The f i f t h  im portant t r u th  th a t  we a re  going to  consider 
i s  in  f a c t  a m u ltip le  t r u t h ,  and d ea ls  in  a more proximate 
manner w ith th e  p r in c ip le s  which are  used by the educated man 
in  a c t o f  achieving p e rfe c tio n  in  th e  in te l l e c tu a l  o rd e r.
The t i t l e  of t h i s  f i f t h  t r u th  i s :  th e  v a l id i ty  o f th e  high­
e s t  p r in c ip le s  of thought and be ing . The use of both  th e  
terms thought and being may be thought unnecessary , because 
i f  th ey  are  p r in c ip le s  o f being  they  w il l  be p r in c ip le s  of 
though t, but the  term  i s  used ad v ised ly , because they  a re  
here considered as p r in c ip le s  o f being in  as f a r  as they
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a f fe c t  th e  knowing and th in k in g  su b je c t. For th e  i n t e r ­
p re ta tio n  of l i f e  and th e  un iverse  as a whole, fo r  th e  
harm onization o f th e  in d iv id u a l f a c ts  in to  an organic 
u n i t ,  fo r  the u n if ic a tio n  o f knowledge so th a t  nothing 
i s  r e a l ly  known u n t i l  every th ing  i s  r e a l ly  grasped, the  
educated man must co n s ta n tly  apply the  p r in c ip le s  o f meta­
phy sics . These p r in c ip le s  must be known, adm itted , 
accepted and l iv e d . The knowledge o f th ese  p r in c ip le s  i s  
not a d i f f i c u l t  ta s k ,  they  a re  s e lf -e v id e n t .  For th e re  
e x is ts  in  us c e r ta in  seeds of knowledge, f i r s t  p r in c ip le s
t e l l e c t  comes in  co n tac t with r e a l i t y .
For reasons o f c l a r i ty ,  th e se  fundamental p r in c ip le s  
w il l  b e t re a te d  sep a ra te ly  to  show th e  f u l l  fo rce  o f each 
p r in c ip le ,  and the  d is t in c t io n  between them, bu t i t  must 
always be borne in  mind th a t  they are c lo se ly  in terdepen ­
d en t, and are s e lf -e v id e n t p r in c ip le s .  They are  im provable, 
not because o f  th e i r  o b sc u rity , but because th ey  are  lum i­
nous w ith th e  sp lendor o f t r u th .
The o rder in  which th e se  p r in c ip le s  w il l  be considered 
w il l  be: the  p r in c ip le  o f C o n trad ic tio n , th e  p r in c ip le  of
Id e n t i ty ,  th e  p r in c ip le  of S u f f ic ie n t  Reason, and the  
p rin c ip le  of C au sa lity . There i s  some d isp u te  among v a r i ­
ous authors as to  which p r in c ip le ,  th a t  of C on trad ic tion  
o r th a t  o f  Id e n t i ty  should be f i r s t  in  th e  o rder o f inven­
of knowledge, which one knows immediately th e  i n
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t i o n ,  bu t th a t  need not delay  us here beeause both  are  
c e r ta in ly  s e lf -e v id e n t.
a) The P rin c ip le  of C on trad ic tion
The enuncia tion  o f  t h i s  p r in c ip le  as  a  p r in c ip le  o f 
being may be form ulated as fo llow s: Being cannot be non-
being . And an enunciation  o f t h i s  p r in c ip le  as a p r in c i­
p le  of knowledge i s :  We cannot a t  once both a ffirm  and
deny a th in g . The fo rce  o f the  p r in c ip le  i s  immediately 
apparen t, in  f a c t  i t  i s  so apparent th a t  i t  may seem a 
waste o f tim e to  enunciate i t ,  but i t  i s  of th e  g re a te s t  
importance because i t  i s  found to  be based on th e  prim ary 
in tu i t io n  of th e  i n t e l l e c t  o f being , and th e  in te l l e c tu a l  
grasp  o f being i s  a t  the h e a r t o f every a c t of th e  in te l l e c tu ­
a l  f a c u lty .  Each in te l l e c tu a l  a c t o f man includes th e  in ­
tu i t io n  of b e in g . And from th a t  in tu i t io n  th e  basic  p r in c i ­
p le  o f C o n trad ic tio n  i s  subsumed in  a l l  a c ts  o f in te l l e c t io n .  
This p r in c ip le  r e s t s  on th e  n a tu res  o f being and non-being, 
w ith which th e  concept i s  id e n t i f ie d  and i s  th e  primary b a s is
of a l l  o th e r p r in c ip le s .  This p r in c ip le  i s  d iscussed  by Aquinas
(16)
in  the  Summa Theologica.
b) The P r in c ip le  o f Id e n ti ty
This p rin c ip le  may be enunciated as fo llow s: Being i s
being . This one enunciation  holds good fo r  both th e  o rder
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of b e in g  and th e  o rder o f in te l l ig e n c e .  This i s  th e  f i r s t  
judgment in  th e  o n to lo g ica l o rd er because nothing i s  known 
ap a rt from being , and a l l  th a t  i s  known i s  known in  fu n c tio n  
of be ing . I t  may seem th a t  th is  i s  a sentence w ithout sense 
but i f  i t  i s  th o u g h tfu lly  analyzed i t  w i l l  be seen to  be an 
expression  of th e  prim ary a c t o f judgment th a t  th e  in t e l l e c t  
makes. I t  i s  th e  f i r s t ,  most sim ple, and most u n iv e rsa l o f 
th e  judgments th a t  i s  made and i t  has fo r  i t s  su b je c t,b e in g , 
and fo r  i t s  p re d ic a te , th a tw h ic h  belongs to  being in  th e  
prim ary sense, b e in g . This i s  th e  u ltim a te  in  th e  o rder 
of judgments, and a l l  judgments can be reduced to  th i s  
form ula, and fu n c tio n  in  term s o f  th a t  form ula. For those  
who a re  unused to  th in k in g  in  a b s tra c t  te rm s, th e  i l l u s t r a ­
t io n  used by C hesterton  in  h is  book on S t .  Thomas Aquinas 
i s  very h e lp fu l.  He suggests th a t  in s te a d  of using  the  
term s ens e s t  e n s . o f "being I s  being" o r "a p a r t ic u la r  
being i s  a p a r t ic u la r  b e in g " , we make use o f th e  sim ple, 
homey sentence "p igs i s  p ig s" . The fo rce  of t h i s  example 
i s  s t r ik in g .  I t  shows a t  one and the  same tim e th e  in s ig h t 
th a t  C hesterton had in to  the  mind of Aquinas, th e  a l l -  
pervading in flu en ce  o f th e  p r in c ip le  of I d e n t i ty ,  and the  
complete and constan t con tac t th a t  the  philosophy o f the  
Angelic Doctor has with the  co n cre te , one might almost say 
•tolgar, r e a l i t i e s  o f l i f e .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
P .6 6
c) The P rin c ip le  o f S u ff ic ie n t Reason
The enuncia tion  of t h i s  p r in c ip le  may be as fo llow s: 
Every being has i t s  being e i th e r  from i t s e l f  or from an o th er. 
This i s  another statem ent th a t  i s  obvious. I t  i s  not t e l l ­
ing  you th a t  any being e x i s t s ,  n o t t e l l in g  you th a t  any 
being i s  dependent. I t  i s  simply s ta t in g  th a t  th e  being 
o f apy th in g  th a t  does e x is t  i s  e i th e r  s u f f ic ie n t  in  i t ­
s e l f ,  o r  has i t s  source in  some o th e r  be ing . This t ru th  
again i s  s e lf -e v id e n t,  and perhaps the  e f f o r t  to  enlarge 
i t  o r exp lain  i t  w il l  only  obfuscate i t .  But th e re  i s  
one am p lifica tio n  of i t  th a t  i t  i s  necessary  to  p resen t 
h e re . Whatever belongs to  a th in g  w ithout belonging to  
i t  according to  i t s  i n t r in s ic  c o n s ti tu tio n  has i t s  s u f f i ­
c ien t reason , not in  th a t  th in g  but in  an o th e r. This 
somewhat negative enuncia tion  i s  deemed necessary  to  lead  
to  the po in t of departu re  fo r  the  consequent p r in c ip le .
I t  i s  thought u se fu l to  show th e  re la t io n s h ip  of non­
su ffic ien cy  in  a c e r ta in  lim ite d  being to  th e  p r in c ip le  
o f S u f f ic ie n t  ’Reason. I t  w i l l  be again n o ticed  th a t  
th e re  i s  no need to  form ulate two modes of the  p r in c ip le ,  
one fo r  the  o n to lo g ica l o rd e r , and one fo r  the  in te l l e c tu ­
a l  o rd e r, fo r here  again we are  in  the  realm o f judgment, 
and the judgment r e fe r s  d i r e c t ly  to  th in g s , no t to  the  
re la tio n s h ip  o f  th in g s  to  th e  in te l l ig e n c e . This p r in c i-
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p ie i s  t r e a te d  by Aquinas in  th e  Summa Theologica. where he 
says:
hoc autem e t s i  p o s s it  d ic i  de habente 
formam quod s c i l i c e t  habeat a l iq u id ,  quod 
non e s t  ipsum .B
d) The P r in c ip le  of C ausa lity
The enunciation  o f  t h i s  p r in c ip le ,  in  i t s  s im plest 
form i s  as fo llow s: Every e f f e c t  must have a c au se * And
th i s  p r in c ip le  fo llow s immediately from the  p r in c ip le  o f 
S u ff ic ie n t R*eason and i s  d i r e c t ly  perceived by th e  i n t e l l e c t  
upon th e  p re se n ta tio n  of th e  o b je c t. The p ro ce ss , which i s  
an immediate one, may be broken down in  the  follow ing s tep s  
fo r  th e  purpose of showing i t s  cogency. The o b jec t p resen ted  
to  the i n t e l l e c t  i s  a being , and i s  perceived as such, and not 
non-being. The judgment i s  formed s ta t in g  th a t  t h i s  being 
i s  t h i s  being w ith  the im plied t r u th  th a t  i t  i s  no t a l l  
being , o r being in  i t s  p e rfe c tio n , th e re fo re  i t  has not in  
i t s e l f  th e  su ff ic ie n c y  of be ing  and i s  a  l im ite d  being th a t  
must have i t s  reason (r a t i o ) o f being from being i t s e l f .
The causal p r in c ip le  i s  c le a r ,  t h i s  being , t h i s  l im ite d  and, 
th e re fo re , dependent being i s  an e f f e c t  o f  p e rfe c t o r com­
p le te  and independent b e in g . A cause of some confusion may 
be here  avoided i f  i t  i s  made c le a r  th a t  c a u s a li ty  i s  not 
to  b e  confused w ith  fo rc e , a confusion th a t  i s  f a i r l y
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common in  th ese  days o f p hysica l sc ience . Force i s  a
vec to r q u a n tity , an a b s tra c tio n  in  the mathem atical
o rder lim ite d  to  m a te r ia l b e in g s .s t r i c t ly  as m a te r ia l ,
while c a u s a li ty  i s  a p r in c ip le  in  th e  m etaphysical o r -
(18)
d e r , as la rg e  as being i t s e l f .
A phase o f th e  P r in c ip le  of C au sa lity  which must be 
tre a te d  here i s  th a t  which r e la te s  to  f in a l  c a u s a l i ty .
The p r in c ip le  o f f in a l  c a u s a lity  lik ew ise  flows from th e  
p r in c ip le  o f s u f f ic ie n t  reason and may be s ta te d :  Every
perform er o f an a c tio n  a c ts  in  function  o f an end.  And 
i t s  t r u th  i s  c le a r  from th e  P r in c ip le  o f S u ff ic ie n t Reason 
A ll a c tio n , a l l  c a u s a l i ty  must be tra c e d  back to  th e  Brime 
Mover, th e  Person Who i s  a l l  b e in g , and th e re fo re  a l l  
in te l l ig e n c e .  And th e  consequence o f t h i s  i s  th a t  a l l  
ac tio n  w il l  tak e  p lace in  fu n c tio n  of th a t  in te l l ig e n c e ,  
and so w il l  be in te l l ig e n t  a c tio n . I n te l l ig e n t  a c tio n  
means th e  a t ta in in g  of some end o r purpose, and the use of 
th e  proper means to  a t t a in  th a t  end. The p r in c ip le  th e re ­
fo re  i s  c le a r ,  th a t  every perform er o f an a c tio n , a c ts  in  
fu n c tio n  of an end. I t  i s  not s ta te d  and not meant th a t  
every agent i s  conscious of the end, bu t th a t  in  a l l  a c tio n  
th e re  i s  a f in a l i ty .
These are th e  b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  th a t  must be kept in  
mind by anyone who e n te rs  th e  f ie ld  o f pedagogy. For th e
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acceptance of th e se  p r in c ip le s  i s  th e  f i r s t  s tep p in g - 
stone to  th e  discovery of t r u t h  and knowledge. I f  th ese  
p r in c ip le s  are  ignored chaos w i l l  fo llow , because the  in ­
t e l l e c t  w i l l  b e w ithout a measure, w il l  have to  s e t  i t ­
s e l f  up as the  standard  of t r u th ,  w hile ignoring  th e  ob­
je c tiv e  demands of th in g s  and r e a l i t y .  And i f  t h i s  t r a ­
gedy tak es  p la c e , as i t  has taken  place in  th e  l iv e s  of 
some so -c a lled  pedggogical e x p e r ts , i t  w i l l  be, as i t  
has been in  th e  p a s t,  th e  case of the  b lin d  lead ing ' the  
b lin d  in to  deeper and deeper morasses o f ignorance and 
s tu p id i ty .  These t ru th s  are not m ental sp ecu la tio n s , 
they  are  p o s tu la te s  o f r e a l i ty ,  and th e  i n t e l l e c t  formu­
la te s  them because i t  i s  formed to  know r e a l i t y  and i s  
measured.by r e a l i t y .  The i n t e l l e c t  o f man i s  not the  
prim al source o f t r u th  bu t must be measured by th e  s tan ­
dard o f  r e a l i ty .
The e s s e n t ia l  po in t in  any p h ilo so p h ica l system o f  
education  i s  th e  a c q u is it io n  o f u n ity ,  otherw ise education  
becomes mere fa c t  g a th e rin g , and not a human a c t iv i ty .  
P ac ts , d a ta  and experience must a l l  be gathered to g e th e r  
and bound by p r in c ip le s  of thought and b e in g . In  o th e r 
words, u n ity  depends on o b je c t iv i ty ,  and th e  only p h ilo ­
sophy th a t  has o b je c t iv i ty  i s  th a t  which i s  founded on 
being in  i t s  t o t a l i t y ,  th e  philosophy o f A r is to tle  and
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Aquinas. The chaos and th e  confusion o f th e  v ario u s  schools 
o f modern thought do not come, as they  fondly  seem to  ima­
g in e , from th e i r  b e l ie f  in  l i b e r ty .  They spring  from an 
a n t i - in te l l e c tu a l  b ia s  which lead s  them to  deny th e  l im ita ­
t io n s  o f t h e i r  own in te l le c ts }  by th a t  I  do no t mean the  
a cc id en ta l l im ita tio n s  o f in te l l e c tu a l  a b i l i ty  o r t r a in in g ,  
fo r  many of them are  endowed w ith good in te l l e c tu a l  a b i l i ­
t i e s .  I  mean th e  n a tu ra l  l im ita tio n  o f a l l  dependent 
in t e l l e c t s  on th e  o b je c t iv i ty  o f th in g s . I  mean th e  fa c t  
th a t  has been s tre s se d  so o fte n  in  the l a s t  few pages th a t  
th e  mind o f man does not pretend  to  b e , and cannot preterid 
to  be th e  source o f t r u th  nor the  measure o f  b e in g , but 
must r e s t  content to  face  th e  f a c t  th a t  t r u th  i s  in  th in g s  
form ally  and c a u sa lly , and in  h is  mind and in te ll ig e n c e  
in  as f a r  as th ey  conform to  the ex igencies o f b e in g .
P art Two: The Psychological Truths Immediately
Connected w ith  the Process of Education
The second s e r ie s  o f t r u th s  w ith which we a re  con­
cerned in  a philosophy o f education i s  a s e r ie s  o f t ru th s  
dea lin g  w ith the  n a tu re  o f man -  th e  su b jec t o f education* 
They are c la s s i f ie d  as psycholog ical t ru th s  because they  
dea l w ith the soul o f man, th e  formal p r in c ip le  o f  l i f e ,  
th e  form th a t  makes a man a man and d is tin g u ish e s  him
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from the  o th e r c la s se s  o f be ing . The t ru th s  here considered 
are  more proximate in  ap p lic a tio n  to  a philosophy of peda­
gogy because they  concern them selves w ith  more immediate 
p r in c ip le s .  The o rder in  which th ey  are to be considered 
i s  as follow s: The in c o r ru p t ib i l i ty  o f the  so u l, th e
n a tu re  and powers o f the i n t e l l e c t ,  th e  n a tu re  and powers 
o f th e  w i l l ,  th e  d ig n ity  o f  th e  human person.
1 , The In c o r r u p t ib i l i ty  of th e  Soul 
The importance of t h i s  p r in c ip le  as a p r in c ip le  o f 
pedagogy i s  th a t  i t  e s ta b lis h e s  th e  fo c a l p o in t o f educa­
t io n .  I f  t h i s  l i f e  were th e  sum t o t a l  o f human e x is te n c e , 
then th e  fo c a l po in t o f educative e n te rp r is e  would be 
t h i s  w orld; i f  m an's soul i s  in c o r ru p tib le , then  secu la r­
ism i s  an educational f a l s i t y .  And in  th e  philosophy of
(19)
Aquinas, the  human sou l i s  in c o r ru p tib le . Here Aquinas
asks the very question  we ask:
"Whether th e  human sou l i s  co rru p tib le?"
And here i s  h is  rep ly :
"We must a s s e r t  th a t  the  in t e l l e c tu a l  p r in c ip le  
which we c a l l  th e  human soul i s  in c o r ru p tib le .
For a th ing  may be corrup ted  in  two ways -  in  
i t s e l f  and acc id en ta lly . Now i t  i s  im possible fo r  
any su b s is te n t being to  be generated  or corrup ted  
a c c id e n ta lly , th a t  i s ,  by th e  generation  o r 
co rrup tion  o f something e ls e .  For generation  
and co rru p tio n  belong to  a th in g  in  the  same 
way th a t  being belongs to  i t ,  which i s  acquired 
by generation  and l o s t  by c o rru p tio n . There­
fo re ,  whatever has being in  i t s e l f  cannot be
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"generated o r corrupted  except in  i t s e l f j  while 
th in g s  which do not s u b s is t , such as  acciden ts 
and m a te ria l forms, acquire being o r lo se  i t  through 
the  genera tion  o r co rru p tio n  o f composites* Now 
i t  was shown above th a t  th e  sou ls  of b ru te s  are  not 
s e lf - s u b s is te n t ,  whereas th e  human soul i s . . . . n
(20)
In  th e  "above", here re fe rre d  t o ,  he proves th a t  th e  human
so u l, because i t  ex e rc ises  in te l l ig e n c e ,  i s  su b sis ten t*
The proof i s  sim ple. The human in te l l ig e n c e  knows many
forms in  an a b s tra c t  way; th e re fo re ,  i t  i s  a s p i r i tu a l
s u b s is te n t be ing . To continue the  qu o ta tio n :
" ..S o  th a t  the sou ls of b ru te s  are  co rrup ted  when 
th e i r  bodies are  co rru p ted , while th e  human soul 
could no t be corrupted  u n less  i t  were co rrup ted  in  
i t s e l f .  This i s  im possib le , not only in  regard to  
th e  human so u l, but a lso  in  regard  any su b s is te n t 
being th a t  i s  a form a lo n e . For i t  i s  c le a r ,  th a t  
what belongs to  a th in g  by v ir tu e  o f th e  th in g  i t ­
s e l f  i s  in separab le  from i t .  But being belongs to  
a  form, which i s  an a c t ,  by v ir tu e  o f  i t s e l f .  And 
th u s , m a tte r acquires a c tu a l being according as i t  
acqu ires form, while i t  i s  corrupted  so f a r  as th e  
form i s  separated  from i t .  But i t  i s  im possible 
fo r  a  form to  be separa ted  from i t s e l f ,  and th e re ­
fo re  i t  i s  im possible fo r  a su b s is ten t form to  cease to 
e x is t ."
Here i s  a c le a r  proof o f th e  in c o r ru p t ib i l i ty  o f th e  human 
soul e i th e r  per se o r per aec id en s. The consequences o f 
t h i s  t r u t h  on a philosophy o f education  have been poin ted  
out above. A philosophy o f education  cannot be s e c u la r is t ,  
because in  so be ing , i t  would be u n r e a l i s t i c .  Here i s  a 
condemnation on th e  b a s is  o f reason alone of much th a t  i s  
common in  educational c i r c l e s .
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2 , The Nature and Powers o f  th e  I n te l l e c t
The second t r u th  in  t h i s  group t r e a t s  of th e  Nature
o f the  I n te l l e c t  and I t s  Powers. And the Nature of th e
human in t e l l e c t  may be s ta te d  as:
" In te l le c tu s  humanus e s t  p o te n tia  cognoscitiva  
anorgan ica." (21)
This can be tra n s la te d  to  say :
"The human in t e l l e c t  i s  a  non-organic power of 
knowing.w
The proofs o f the v a l id i ty  o f t h i s  d e f in it io n  come from 
th e  f a c ts th a t  the human in te l l ig e n c e ,  as i s  c le a r  to  a l l ,  
i s  ab le to  form u n iv e rsa l concep ts, i s  able to  a b s tra c t  
from in d iv id u a l b e in g s, i s  ab le to  d is t in g u is h  between 
what n e c e ssa r ily  belongs to  a being and what i s  acciden tal*  
A ll th ese  powers, which are  apparent to  any th in k in g  sub­
j e c t ,  show th a t  th e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  a knowing power, because 
i t  g iv es  knowledge, and i t  i s  non-organic because i t  i s
capable o f forming a b s tra c t  concepts which are  independent
(22)
of m a tte r . Aquinas t r e a t s  t h i s  t r u th  in  th e  Summa Theologica
where he s ta te s :
" I t  i s  necessary, to  say th a t  th e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  a power 
o f th e  s o u l." (23)
The powers o f the human in t e l l e c t  are  summed up in  th e  
th re e  in t e l l e c tu a l  ac tio n s  which th e  fa c u lty  perform s. These 
are th e  o p era tio n s  o f th e  i n t e l l e c t ,  and the  argument from
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what a c tu a l ly  occurs to  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f i t s  occurence 
i s  ev iden t; i f  a th in g  a c tu a lly  happens, i t  i s  able to  
happen. The in te l l ig e n c e  perform s th ese  a c ts ;  i t  has th e  
power to  do so . The f i r s t  Power of th e  I n te l l e c t  th a t  we 
wish to  observe i s  th a t  of apprehension. This i s  the  ac t 
by which the  i n t e l l e c t  knows th e  essence of m a te ria l th in g s . 
And i t  i s  th e  primary ac t of th e  i n t e l l e c t .  When any p a r t i ­
c u la r  th in g  i s  observed by a human being , th e  concept which 
i s  formed in  th e  mind i s  a u n iv e rsa l and e s s e n t ia l  concept. 
When we see a t r e e ,  th e  f i r s t  concept we get i s  th a t  o f  
t r e e .  This i s  an evident t r u th  and can be seen by contempla­
t io n ,  The second power o f th e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  th a t  o f .judgment. 
The ac t o f  judgment i s  performed when th e  i n t e l l e c t  compares 
two th in g s  and affirm s o r d en ies  one about th e  o th e r . Any 
sentence th a t  i s  u tte re d  by a  human being i s  th e  expression 
o f vocal s igns s ig n ify in g  the  in te l l e c tu a l  a c t o f  jugement.
The th i r d  Power o f the I n te l l e c t  i s  th a t  o f reason ing .  The 
power o f reasoning co n s is ts  in  th e  power to  compare two judge­
ments and to  form a th i r d  judgment. This i s  done by compar­
ing  th e  two term s o f th e  f in a l  judgment to  a common middle 
term . The power o f reasoning may be ex erc ised  in  e i th e r  an 
inductive  o r a deductive manner. In  in d u c tio n , th e  process 
i s  from a s e r ie s  o f p a r t ic u la r  t r u th s  to  a general and h i th e r ­
to  unknown t r u th .  In  deduction , th e  process i s  from a general 
and u n iv e rsa l t ru th  to  a p a r t ic u la r  t r u th .  These th re e  powers 
o f the  i n t e l l e c t  must be w e ll understood by th e  ph ilosopher
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of pedagogy, because they a re  the  immediate m a te r ia l w ith 
which he i s  to  be concerned in  s e tt in g  fo r th  th e  p r in c ip le s  
which must be used in  a c q u is itio n  of knowledge. In  them­
se lves th ey  are not d i f f i c u l t ,  bu t f a i lu r e  to  ap p rec ia te  
t h e i r  n a tu re , and p a r t ic u la r ly  f a i lu r e  to  ap p rec ia te  th e i r  
interdependence w i l l  lead  to  considerab le  e rro r  in  the 
area  o f education . The danger i s  th a t  judgments w i l l  be 
formed and conclusions drawn th a t  are not ju s t i f i e d  by the 
preceding a c ts  of apprehension and judgment.
In  function  o f th ese  th ree  Bowers of the  I n t e l l e c t ,
th e  types o f knowledge which are p o ssib le  fo r  the i n t e l l e c t
(24)
of man may be considered  h e re .
The f i r s t  type o f knowledge i s  concerned w ith human 
l i f e  in  the  most g en era l manner, and i s  th e  most common 
type o f knowledge. I t  concerns i t s e l f  w ith th e  p r a c t ic a l  
o rd e r, and with manners of a c tio n . And i t  c o n s is ts  in  mak­
ing judgments about the use o f proper means fo r  achieving 
c e r ta in  ends. In  t h i s  type o f knowledge the  a c t o f  
apprehension and th e  a c t of judgment about th in g s  i s  taken 
w ithout much r e f le c t io n ,  and th e  conclusions are  formed and 
acted  upon w ithout c a re fu l sc ru tin g y  of them. The second 
type of knowledge i s  concerned w ith c e r ta in  ways o f th in k ­
ing about r e a l i ty .  I t  c o n s is ts  in  a  r e f le c t io n  of the  
i n t e l l e c t  upon concepts which th e  i n t e l l e c t  reco g n izes  as
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concepts and uses th ese  as a b a s is  fo r  fu r th e r  in te l l e c tu a l  
a c tio n . This i s  the  type o f knowledge which i s  found in  
th e  ph ilosopher and in  th e  m athem atician.
The th i rd  type of knowledge i s  p oetic  knowledge and i t  
i s  concerned w ith th in g s  in  as much they  a re  th e  product 
o f e re a tio n . This means i t  a b s tr a c ts ,  i t  judges, i t  forms 
conclusions about th in g s , no t about concepts, in  as much 
they are the  f r u i t  o f in te l l ig e n c e  and a r t .  This type 
o f knowledge i s  only po ssib le  to  th e  in t e l l e c t  which has 
so p en etra ted  th e  essence o f beings th a t  i t  sees them a l l  
under the aspect o f  c re a tio n , e i th e r  th e  abso lu te  c rea tio n  
o f th e  f i r s t  cause, o r th e  r e la t iv e  c re a tio n  o f  secondary 
causes. But t h i s  type o f knowledge does not d e a l express­
ly  w ith  concepts, i t  d e a ls  w ith  th in g s .  The fo u rth  type 
of knowledge i s  q u ite  ra re  and i t  d ea ls  w ith  r e a l i ty  which 
i s  incapable of being expressed as a concept, and which i s  
recognized as th e  u ltim a te  term  of th e  a c t of knowledge. In  
o th e r words, i t  concerns i t s e l f  w ith  abso lu te  r e a l i ty  which 
i s  th e  te r n  and th e  end of a l l  knowledge. I t  i s  th e  peak 
o f human connatu ral knowledge.
The philosopher o f pedagogy must be fa m ilia r  w ith th ese  
types o f knowledge. Indeed , he must be thoroughly versed  
in  the  in t r ic a c ie s  of th e  f i r s t  two ty p e s , th a t  i s  to  say 
he must be an au th o rity  on the  p re d e n tia l and th e  sp ecu la tiv e
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asp ects  o f being. I t  i s  not necessary  th a t  he be fa m ilia r  
w ith  th e  th i r d  and fo u rth  types o f knowledge, as indeed i t  
i s  not given to  a l l  to  be poets and contem platives, bu t he 
must have a knowledge o f what th ese  th in g s  mean, th e i r  p o ssi­
b i l i t y  and the f a c t  th a t  they are  th e  crowning peak of 
h e ig h ts  th a t  may be scaled  in  human though t. And because 
they  a re  the arduous h e ig h ts  o f thought they should form th e  
id e a l  and the  goal o f  any p h ilo so p h ica l endeavour to  place 
a complete plan o f education .
3 . The Nature and Powers o f th e  W ill
The th i rd  t r u th  in  th i s  group i s  concerned w ith  the
Nature and Powers o f th e  W ill. The W ill i s  defined:
"Voluntas human e s t  p o te n tia  anorganica, quae 
s im p lie i te r  e s t  im p erfec tio r i n te l l e c tu ,  secun­
dum quid tamen e s t  p e r fe c t io r ,  quatenus v e rsa tu r  
c i r c a  re s  n o b ilio re s  anima ip s a ,  e t  secundum quid 
im p e rfe c tio r , quatenus v e rsa tu r  c irc a  re s  m ater- 
i a l e s , "  U 5)
I t  i s  t r a n s la te d  in  t h i s  manner:
HThe human w il l  i s  a non-organic power which i s ,  ab­
so lu te ly  speaking, in f e r io r  to  th e  i n t e l l e d t ,  bu t 
under c e r ta in  asp ec ts  i t  may be superio r as when i t  
cen te rs  i t s e l f  on something more noble than  the  
so u l, and under c e r ta in  aspects  i t  i s  in f e r io r ,  
as when i t  cen te rs  i t s e l f  on m a te r ia l th in g s ."
The w i l l ,  th en , i s  a power o f th e  human so u l, and i t  i s
dependent on th e  i n t e l l e c t  because th e  w il l  i s  ari a p p e tite
which tends to  th e  possession  o f some good, but th e  good
cannot come in to  con tact w ith the  sou l u n le ss  i t  i s  known
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-  n i l  v o l i tu r  n i s i  p riu s  cognitum -  so th e  w il l  i s  dependent 
on the  i n t e l l e c t ,  bu t a t  tim es, when th e re  i s  a good placed 
before th e  w il l  which i s  a s p i r i tu a l  good, th e  w i l l ,  in  tend­
ing  to  th a t  good, i s  capable of moving the i n t e l l e c t  to  th e  
possession  of th a t  good. And, because i t  i s  capable o f lead ­
ing the  i n t e l l e c t  to  a h igher p e rfe c tio n , i t  i s  su p erio r to  
th e  in t e l l e c t  in  th a t  p a r t ic u la r  o p era tio n . I t  i s  t o  be borne 
in  mind th a t  the  w il l  i s  an a p p e tite  which by i t s  very n a tu re  
tends to  the  possession  o f some good. Anything th a t  i s  de­
s ire d  by the  w i l l  i s  d es ired  by i t  because i t  p resen ts  i t ­
s e l f  to  the w ill  under some aspect o f good. The w i l l  does 
not make a th in g  good o r bad, th a t  i s ,  th e  human w i l l  does 
not give goodness to  a th in g j goodness i s  c o n s titu te d  by 
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  of a th in g  to  th e  w il l  o f the  Prime Mover#
And th a t  re la tio n s h ip  of goodness, which i s  simply a r e la t io n ­
sh ip  th a t  im plies th e  t ru th  th a t  th e  th in g  d es ired  w il l  in  
some way add to  th e  p e rfec tio n  o f  th e  person w ill in g  th e  
possession  of i t .
The Powers o f th e  W ill may be summed up under two head­
in g s . The f i r s t  i s  the Power of Moving the Person to  Act -  
o f  ac tin g  as th e  e f f ic ie n t  cause of ac tion  which w i l l  le a d  to  
an in c rease  in  p e rfe c tio n  o f th e  person . And th e  second i s  
the  Power of Freedom.
The f i r s t  o f  these  Powers i s  d iscu ssed  by Aquinas in  the
(26)
Snamaa Theologies and i s  here quoted from th e  Basic W ritings
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o f S a in t Thomas Aquinas, by A. P eg is, Vol. 1 , p .7 8 2 :-
th in g  i s  sa id  to  move as an ag en t, as what 
a l t e r s  moves what i s  a l te re d  and what impels moves 
what i s  im pelled . In  t h i s  way th e  w i l l  moves the
i n t e l l e c t ,  and a l l  th e  powers o f th e  so u l................
The reason i s ,  because wherever we have o rder among 
a number o f a c tiv e  powers, t h a t  power which i s  r e ­
la te d  to  th e  u n iv e rsa l end moves the  powers which
r e f e r  to  p a r t ic u la r  ends..................Now th e  o b je c t of
th e  w il l  i s  th e  good and the  end in  g e n e ra l, whereas 
each power i s  d ire c te d  to  some su ita b le  good proper 
to  i t ,  as s ig h t i s  d ire c ted  to  th e  percep tion  of 
c o lo r , and th e  i n t e l l e c t  to  the  knowledge o f t r u th .  
Therefore the  w i l l  as an agent moves a l l  th e  powers 
o f the  soul to  th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  a c ts ,  except the  
a n tu ra l powers o f th e  v eg e ta tiv e  p a r t ,  which are  not 
su b jec t to  our cho ice ."
This t r u th  gives to  the ph ilosopher o f pedagogy th e  im portant 
p o s itio n  th a t th e  w i l l  p lays in  a l l  human thought and a c tio n , 
and makes i t  e s s e n t ia l  f o r  him to  form ulate a philosophy which 
w il l  include education o f th e  w i l l .
The second t r u th  w ith which we are concerned i s  th a t  o f 
th e  freedom o f the  W ill, I f  the  w il l  moved o f n e c e s s ity , 
then  th e re  would be no way in  which th e  w il l  could come un­
der the  in flu en ce  of education , and no a t te n t io n  need be 
paid to  i t .  But, i f  th e  w i l l  i s  f re e ,  then t ra in in g  in  th e
use of th a t  freedom i s  an im portant p a r t  in  education . This
(27)
p o in t i s  t re a te d  by Aquinas in  th e  Summa Theologica where 
he asks the  question :
"Whether man has f re e  choice?"
And he re p lie s :
"But man a c ts  from judgment, because by h is  apprehen-
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Msive  power he judges something should be avoided 
o r sought. But because t h i s  judgment, in  th e  case 
o f some p a r t ic u la r  a c t ,  i s  not from  n a tu ra l in s t i n c t ,  
bu t from some a c t o f comparison in  th e  reason , th e re ­
fo re  he a c ts  from fre e  judgment and re ta in s  th e  power 
o f be ing  inclined to  v a rio u s  th in g s . For reason in  
contingent m a tte rs  may follow  opposite  co u rses , as 
we see in  d ia le c t ic a l  sy llogism s and r h e to r ic a l  argu­
ment s . Now p a r t ic u la r  op era tio n s  are  co n tin g en t, and 
th e re fo re  in  such m atte rs  th e  judgment o f reason may 
fo llow  opposite  co u rses , and i s  not determ inate to  
one. And in  th a t  man i s  r a t io n a l ,  i t  i s  necessary  
th a t  he have f re e  choice«n(28)
And the  nature o f  th e  Freedcmofthe W ill i s  explained  as
fo llow s:
MThe proper a c t of f re e  choice i s  e le c t io n , fo r  we 
say we have f re e  choicd because we can take one 
th in g  while re fu s in g  ano ther; and th is  i s  to  e l e c t .  
Therefore we must consider th e  n a tu re  o f f re e  
choice by considering  th e  natu re  o f e le c t io n . Now 
two th in g s  concur in  e le c tio n : one on th e  p a r t o f
th e  cogn itive  power, th e  o th e r on th e  p a r t  o f the 
a p p e titiv e  power. On th e  p a r t o f th e  cogn itive  
power, counsel i s  req u ired  by which we judge one 
th in g  to  be p re fe rre d  to  ano ther; on the p a r t of 
the  a p p e tit iv e  power i t  i s  req u ired  th a t  the  appe­
t i t e  should accept the  judgment o f the  counse l. 
. . . . . . . t h e  proper o b jec t o f e le c tio n  i s  th e  means
to  the  end. Now th e  means, as such, has th e  nature 
o f th a t  good which i s  c a l le d  u se fu l; and since  th e  
good, as such, i s  th e  o b jec t o f th e  ap p e tite^  i t  
fo llow s th a t  e le c t io n  i s  p r in c ip a lly  an a c t  o f the
‘ ‘ ’ . And thus f re e  choice i s  an a p p e ti-
This teach ing  on Freedom of the  W ill i s  in  d ir e c t  c o n tra s t
to  the  b asic  p r in c ip le s  held  by th e  N a tu ra l is ts ,  who hold
th a t  man i s  determ ined in  h is  a c tio n s  and has no freedom.
I t  a lso  d isposes of the  d o c tr in e s  o f th e  R a d ic a l-S o c ia lis ts
and the  N a tio n a lis ts  who hold th a t  man i s  merely a u n it  o f 
a m a te r ia l so c ie ty  and lacking  in  freedom.
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4 . The D ignity o f the Human Person
The fo u rth  psycholog ical t r u th  th a t  i s  e s s e n tia l  
fo r  the ph ilosopher o f education i s  th e  t r u th  concern­
ing th e  importance and d ig n ity  o f th e  human person . The 
human person i s  th e  su b jec t on whom education i s  t r i e d ,  
and i f  h is  proper d ig n ity  and importance are  no t appre­
c ia te d , th e  e d u c a tio n a lis t  i s  f a i l in g  in  h is  ta s k .  X 
want to  s tr e s s  here the d is t in c t io n  between the f a c t  o f 
in d iv id u a li ty  and p e rso n a lity . The in d iv id u a l, as th e  
word im p lie s , i s  a m a te ria l th in g , undivided in  i t s e l f  
and divided from o th e rs , and man, as  possessing  m atte r 
may be looked upon as an in d iv id u a l -  th e  A r is to te l ia n -  
Thomistic D octrine i s  th a t  m ateria  s ig n a ta  q u a n tita te  
i s  the p r in c ip le  o f in d iv id u a tio n  -  but th i s  id ea  i s  an 
a b s tra c tio n  from th e  world o f  r e a l i ty ,  Man i s  a person.
The meaning of th i s  sentence w i l l  be c le a r  from th e  follow ­
ing  quo ta tion  o f R .P . G arrigou-Lagrange, O.P. in  h is  work
(3Q)
Le Sens Commun:
" In d iv id u a lity  which d is tin g u ish e s  us from o th e r  
members o f th e  same sp e c ie s , comes from th e  body, 
from m atte r which occupies t h i s  o r th a t  p o rtio n  
o f space d i s t in c t  from th a t  occupied by any o th e r 
man. By our in d iv id u a li ty  we are e s s e n t ia l ly  de­
pendent on our m ilieu , on such and such a c lim a te , 
on such and such h e re d ity  (Greeks, L a tin s , Saxons). 
C h ris t was a Jew. P e rso n a lity , on the  co n tra ry , 
comes from th e  so u l, i t  i s  even th e  subsistence 
o f soul independent o f the body. As a person,
C h ris t i s  God."
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F urther on, he g ives us th e  n o tio n s  o f p e rso n a lity :
•'The elem ents which are p roper to  p e rso n a lity  
are p e rfe c tio n s  in  whose n o tions th e re  i s  in v o l­
ved no im p erfec tio n , su b sis ten ce , in te l l ig e n c e  
and l i b e r t y .1*
And th e  importance o f th i s  t r u th  i s  s tre sse d  by J .  M arita in ,
, . (32)
in  Les Degres du S avo ir:
"The no tion  of p e r s o n a l i ty ,,  no m atte r how complex 
i t  may appear, i s  before a l l  an o n to lo g ica l notion*
I t  i s  a m etaphysical and su b s ta n tia l  p e rfe c tio n  
which overflow s in to  the  o rd e r o f o pera tions w ith 
g rea t psychological and g re a t moral s ig n if ic a n c e ."
(33)
And, in  The Three Reformers he t e l l s  us what th a t  g rea t
s ig n if ic a n c e  i s :
"According to  th e  teach in g  o f S t .  Thomas, on the  
c o n tra ry , man t o t a l l y ,  as an in d iv id u a l i s  c e r ta in ­
ly  u t  pars in  th e  so c ie ty , and i s  ordained to  the  
good of th e  so c ie ty  as the p a r t  i s  ordained to  the  
whole, to  th e  common good, which i s  more d iv ine 
(than th e  in d iv id u a l good) and which m erits  fo r  t h i s  
reason to  be loved by each one more than  h is  l i f e *
But when th e re  i s  a question  of a person as such, 
th e  whole o rder i s  inversed  and i t  i s  th e  so c ie ty  
which i s  ordained to  the  e te rn a l  in te r e s t s  of the 
person and to  h is  p erso n a l good, which i s ,  in  the 
ld s t  a n a ly s is , the  common good of a l l ,  I  mean God 
H im self, because each person , as such, i s  a t o t a l i t y ,  
and each person i s  ordained d i r e c t ly  to  God as to  h is  
own proper end, and fo r  t h i s  reason , in  the  o rder o f  
c h a r ity  he can p re fe r  nothing to  h im self save God."
and, con tinu ing , he s a y s : " ^
"The person i s  fo r  God, and th e  so c ie ty  i s  fo r  the  
person."
From the  foregoing t r u th  i s  drawn th a t  statem ent which 
was quoted above from th e  D eclara tion  of Independence:
"We hold th ese  t ru th s  to  b e ,s e l f  ev id en t: th a t  a l l
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Mmen are c rea ted  equal; th a t  they  are  endowed by 
th e i r  C reator w ith  c e r ta in  in a lie n a b le  r ig h t s ,  
and anong th ese  are l i f e ,  l ib e r ty  and th e  p u rsu it  
o f happiness." That to  secure th ese  r ig h ts ,  govern­
ments are  in s t i tu te d  among m e n .. . .11
From th ese  t ru th s  th e  p o s itio n  o f th e  R a d ic a l-S o c ia lis ts  
who p lace the  person in  an in f e r io r  p o s itio n  to  the  so c ie ty , 
and th e  p o s itio n  o f the  N a tio n a lis ts  o r th e  S t a t i s t s ,  i s  
seen to  be e n t i r e ly  un tenab le , because they  n eg lec t th e  im­
portance and d ig n ity  of th e  human person .
t  ♦ *
The above sec tio n  o f  th i s  paper has been a b r ie f  
summary o f the  o b jec tiv e  t ru th s  in  th e  o n to lo g ica l and 
psychological o rder which are  e s s e n tia l  m a te ria l fo r  the 
philosopher o f pedagogy* The p lan  th a t  was fo llow ed, was 
to  show how a l l  our knowledge i s  dependent on r e a l i ty  and 
being, and u ltim a te ly  on th e  cause of a l l  b e in g . Then 
we l i s t e d  the  t ru th s  concerning th e  nature o f th e  person 
who i s  th e  su b jec t o f educa tio n , th e  n a tu re  o f the i n t e l l i ­
gence to  be tr a in e d ,  of th e  w i l l  to  be developed, and of 
the  p e rso n a lity  to  be c u l t iv a te d . With a l l  th ese  t r u th s  
in  mind we can proceed to  th e  co n sid e ra tio n  o f a s e r ie s  o f 
t ru th s  which have to  do w ith th e  su b jec tiv e  development 
of th e  human person.
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CHAPTER IV 
Subjective Development o f  Man
The o b jec tiv e  t r u th s  which were described  in  th e  
p ast sec tio n  o f t h i s  paper must be lin k ed  w ith th e  su b je c t­
iv e  development of th e  human person. Wisdom, which i s  the  
t r u th  o f contem plating o b jec tiv e  r e a l i ty  as spring ing  from 
the  source of a l l  b e in g , cannot be poured in to  th e  human 
mind. R ather, i t  happens in  th e  mind when th e  educable
a s s im ila te s  t ru th  in  re la t io n  to  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f b e in g .
(1)
The mind feeding on being c o n s ti tu te s  le a rn in g . And
th i s  le a rn in g  i s  a v i t a l  process of man. As Aquinas say s,
knowledge p re -e x is ts  in  th e  le a rn e r ,  no t in  purely  passive
p o te n t ia l i ty ,  bu t in  ac tiv e  p o te n t ia l i ty ,  th a t  i s ,  when th e
in t r in s i c  agent i s  s u f f ic ie n t ly  able to  b ring  i t  to  p e r-  
(2)
fe e t  a c tu a l i ty .  The e s e e n tia l  a c t iv i ty  o f the  le a rn e r  
i s  th e  most im portan t p a rt o f education . Aquinas has a 
prolonged comparison of th e  teach e r to  a docto r o f medi­
c in e , whose whole fun ctio n  i s  t o  remove th e  o b s ta c le s  to  
h e a l th ,  to  f o s te r  r ig h t  co nd itions in  which h e a lth  may 
a s s e r t  i t s e l f  i n  the body. The te ac h e r  has the duty  of 
making the  t ru th  a v a ilab le  to  th e  educable and of encourag­
ing him in  the a c q u is itio n  of i t ,  and o f a id ing  him. But 
the  e s s e n t ia l  p a r t o f knowledge must come from th e  person* 
The su b jec tiv e  development o f th e  person i s  then  the  nex t
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s tep  th a t  must be considered .
From the d iscu ssio n  o f th e  nature  of man in  th e  l a s t
se c tio n , i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  the  su b jec tiv e  development of
man c o n s is ts  in  the b u ild in g  in  o f h a b i ts ,  in te l l e c tu a l  and
voluntary# The in te l l e c tu a l  h a b i t s , ( o r  v i r tu e s ,  s ince  they
are good h a b its ) . w ith the contem plation o f t r u th  as t h e i r
o b je c t, are ind ispensab le  fo r  lea rn in g j but fo r  l iv in g  th e
l i f e  o f v i r tu e ,  which i s  th e  end of l i f e ,  the v o lu n ta ry ,
or moral v ir tu e s  are  a sine qua non. Action i s  d ire c te d
to  the attainm ent o f p e rfe c tio n , and man must d i r e c t  the
(3)
progress o f h is  p e rfe c tio n  by the d ic ta te s  o f reaso n .
To perform th i s  work w e ll, h is  reason must develop c e r ta in  
h a b i ts ,  which a re  determ inants o f the f a c u lty , and which
U )
a s s i s t  th e  fa c u lty  to  operate p e r fe c t ly .  There ought
to  be  as many h a b its  as th e re  are function  in  man because
the  h a b it i s  th e  stamp of reason on human a c t i v i t i e s ,  and
th e  in fluence  of reason ought to  be extended to  th e  e n t ire
(5)
domain of human l i f e .  The t r u ly  educated man i s  the man 
w ith th e  most f u l ly  developed h a b i ts ,  no t only because man*3 
human f a c u l t ie s  a re  p e rfec ted  in  p roportion  to  th e  develop­
ment o f h a b its ,  but because th en  man i s  being guided by
(6 )
reason w ith  ease , e ff ic ie n c y  and co n sis tency . As a d e te r­
m ination o r q u a l i f ic a tio n  o f man, superadded e i th e r  to  h is  
nature o r to  th e  opera tion  fo r  which th a t  n a tu re  e x is t s ,
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h a b it  i s  not a passing  determ ination  but one d i f f i c u l t  to
uproo t; i t  becomes a second n a tu re  by d e l ib e ra te ,  conscious
(7)
and rep ea ted  e f f o r t .  In  b u ild in g  h a b its ,  we are harness­
ing p re -e x is tin g  fo rces ; we are  no t c re a tin g  new fo rc e s .
Inborn c a p a c itie s  are  not enough* ’ reason  must s te p  in  and 
organize a d e f in i te  p a t te rn ,  must make a man m aster in  
h is  own house.
P art One: The I n te l l e c tu a l  V irtues
I n te l le c tu a l  V irtues are h a b its  in  the i n t e l l e c t .
That i s ,  they  a re  d isp o s itio n s  and m odifications of the 
i n t e l l e c t  which enable i t  to  ac t w ith e a se , e ff ic ie n c y  
and co n sis tency . I t  must be s ta te d  here th a t  Aquinas 
d is tin g u ish e s  between the i n t e l l e c t  a s  sp ecu la tiv e  and 
the  i n te l l e c t  as p r a c t ic a l ,  and th e  fo rce  o f t h i s  d is ­
t in c t io n  comes from th e  s ta r t in g  po in t of d if f e re n t  i n t e l l e c t ­
u a l o p e ra tio n s . The method of operation  i s  th e  same, bu t 
the  s ta r t in g  p o in t o f the sp ecu la tiv e  reason i s  th e  forin. 
or essence of a th in g ; the p r a c t ic a l  reason s ta r t s  from 
an end th a t  i s  in tended . The specu la tive  i n t e l l e c t  i s  con­
cerned only w ith th e  t r u th  o f th in g s ; the  p ra c t ic a l  in -
(8 )
t e l l e c t  not only knows th in g s  bu t causes them. And we 
have two d if f e re n t  s e ts  o f I n te l l e c tu a l  V ir tu e s , those 
p e rfe c tin g  the  sp ecu la tiv e  reason , understand ing , sc ien ce , 
and wisdom, and those p e rfe c tin g  the  p r a c t ic a l  reason ,
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(9)
a r t  and prudence.
The f i r s t  o b jec tso f our co n s id e ra tio n  are th e  v ir tu e s
p e rfe c tin g  the sp ecu la tiv e  i n t e l l e c t .  And th e  one th a t  we
w il l  consider f i r s t  i s  the v ir tu e  which i s  formed in  the
in t e l l e c t  by the d is c ip lin in g  of th e  in tu i t iv e  fu n c tio n  of
th e  i n t e l l e c t ,  th e  v ir tu e  of U nderstanding. This in tu i t iv e
function  i s  not to  be understood in  th e  sense of th e  o b je c t
being immediately p resen t to  the i n t e l l e c t ;  i t  means simply
the  f i r s t  a c t o f th e  i n t e l l e c t ,  which i s  th e  a c t o f simple
apprehension which was described  above when the power of
a b s tra c tio n  was proven to  be one o f th e  pwers of the
i n t e l l e c t .  Understanding i s  the in te l l e c tu a l  v ir tu e  which
p e rfe c ts  the spec il la tiv e  i n t e l l e c t  in  i t s  grasp o f f i r s t
(10)
p r in c ip le s ,  the p r in c ip le s  of being which are s e l f  ev id e n t. 
The possession  of th is  v ir tu e  guaran tees th a t  re la t io n s h ip  
between the  i n t e l l e c t  and th e  whole o f r e a l i ty  -  th e  t o t a l i t y  
o f being  -  which c o n s ti tu te s  a very im portant element in  
th e  education o f a man. This v ir tu e  i s  basic fo r  th e  d e ­
velopment o f education as i t  con ta ins in  i t s e l f  th e  seeds
(11)
of a l l  the  sc iences.
The second v ir tu e  o f th e  sp ecu la tiv e  i n t e l l e c t  th a t  i s  
to  be tre a te d  here i s  the  v ir tu e  whieh p e r fe c ts  the  specula­
t iv e  i n t e l l e c t  and d is c ip lin e s  i t  in  th e  a n a ly tic  fu n c tio n , 
the  'v irtue  of knowledge. This i s  the v ir tu e  which p e rfe c ts
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th e  in te l l e c tu a l  power which i s  most p roperly  th a t  o f man*
Though i t  i s  tru e  th a t  man possesses th e  power o f grasping
some th in g s  im m ediately, h is  proper opera tion  -  th a t  which
d is tin g u ish e s  him from a l l  types of in te l l ig e n t  beings -  i s
reasoning# This reasoning  i s  a movement of th e  i n t e l l e c t
from a t ru th  which i s  known to  a t r u th  which i s  h ith e r to
(12)
unknown. The reasoning process begins with an ac t o f in ­
t e l l e c t io n ,  th e  immediate grasp of a p r in c ip le ,  and ends 
w ith another simple a c t ,  an a n a ly s is  by which th e  n a tu re  
of the  ob jec t i s  known. The h a b it which p e rfe c ts  th e  in ­
t e l l e c t  in  the  a c t o f drawing conclusions i s  th e  i n t e l l e c t -
(13)
u a l v ir tu e  o f Science o r knowledge.  I t  i s  l ik e  a l l  the 
o th e r in te l le c tu a l  v ir tu e s  in  t h i s ,  th a t  i t  has t r u th  fo r  
i t s  o b je c t .  The t r u th  i t  seeks i s  th a t  which can be de­
duced from p r in c ip le s  fu rn ished  by th e  ex erc ise  of the  
ir ir tu e  o f understand ing . I t  i s  a d e ta i le d  and lo g ic a l  know­
ledge which analyzes each sec tion  of th e  s c ie n t i f ic  f i e l d .  
S c ie n tif ic  p ro g ress , which i s  th e  aim of th i s  v i r tu e ,  i s
reached by th e  a p p lic a tio n  of the  p r in c ip le s  o f being to
(14)
deeper le v e ls  o r r e a l i ty .  The f a i lu r e  to  achieve th i s  
h a b it on the  p a r t o f th e  le a rn in g  su b jec t, o r  th e  f a i lu r e  
to  e x e rc ise  th is  h a b it  lead s  to  re tro g re ss io n  and d is in te g ra ­
t io n  in  the  knowing su b je c t.
The th ird  v ir tu e  o f the sp ecu la tiv e  in t e l l e c t  which i s  
to  be t re a te d  here i s  th a t  v ir tu e  which d isposes and d is e ip -
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l in e s  the  i n t e l l e c t  in  r e la t io n  to  i t s  sy n th e tic  fu n c tio n s . 
This v ir tu e  i s  the  in te l le c tu a l  v ir tu e  o f wisdom. The 
whole aim of education i s  an in te g ra te d  knowledge o r r e a l i ty .  
The method th a t  must be  follow ed by man i s  th e  piecemeal 
approach in  which each o b je c t must be c a re fu lly  s c ru tin ­
iz e d , each p art c a re fu lly  analyzed , the re la t io n s h ip s  w ith 
o th er th in g s  n o ted . But th e  aim o f the  knowing process ifi 
th e  sy n th es is  ©f a U  f a c t s ,  experiences, deductions and in ­
tu i t io n s  in to  a complete u n ity ,  th e  u n ity  of being , the
harmony o f r e a l i ty .  (M. M arita in  p o in ts  th i s  f a c t  ou t in
/  /
th e  t i t l e  of h is  works Les Degres du Savoir which read s , 
D istinguer pour U nir) .  This sy n th e tic , comprehensive 
v is io n  o f the  whole o f r e a l i ty  i s  made p o ssib le  by the  
v ir tu e  o f wisdom. I t  com pletely p e rfe c ts  manrs specula­
t iv e  reason . I t  harmonizes and o rders th e  work of th e  
v ir tu e s  o f knowledge and understand ing . Wisdom, by the 
sy n th esis  i t  makes o f  the r e a l i t i e s  o f  b e in g , f ix e s  i t s
gaze on the f i r s t  cause o f be ing , th e  p e rfe c tio n  o f b e in g ,
(15)
the  a ll-b e in g , whom we c a l l  God. Wisdom e s ta b lish e s  the 
re la t io n s h ip  of a l l  p a r t ic ip a te d  t r u th  w ith the f in a l  
t r u th .  The aim o f tru e  education i s  the contem plation 
of f in a l  t  ru th  and th i s  contem plation of f in a l  t ru th  i s  
a tta in e d  when the i n t e l l e c t  has developed the v ir tu e  o f  
wisdom. The keen v is io n  of wisdom guards the h ierarchy
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of values in  being , fo r  i t  not merely concerns i t s e l f  w ith
th in g s  as th in g s , bu t w ith  th in g s  as  t r u e .  Wisdom i s  th e
peak of the  I n te l le c tu a l  V ir tu e s , and th e  d e lic a te  and heady
f r u i t  o f  education . And as any education can be  judged by
i t s  f r u i t ,  so an ap p rec ia tio n  o f ,  a comprehension and the
fo s te r in g  of th e  supreme v ir tu e  of the  sp ecu la tiv e  i n t e l l e c t
i s  im perative fo r  th e  ph ilosopher o f education .
In  the  above the  m atter d iscussed  was m atte r r e la t in g
to  the sp ecu la tiv e  o rd e r, but in  the  philosophy of Aquinas
th e re  i s  th e  same d e ta ile d  care devoted to  th e  p ra c t ic a l
o rder and an a n a ly s is  i s  made of th e  v ir tu e s  necessary  to
p e rfec t man in  h is  a c t iv i ty  as w e ll as in  h is  sp ecu la tio n .
In  th e  o rder o f a c t iv i ty  Aquinas d is tin g u ish e s  between th e
a c t iv i ty  o f man which i s  concerned w ith  ac tio n s  o f making
(f a c t i b i l e ) and ac tio n s  which are  concerned w ith  doing 
(16)
( a g ib i le ) , The v ir tu e  which p e rfe c ts  the p r a c t ic a l  man
as maker i s  the v ir tu e  of a r t  and th a t  which p e rfe c ts  man
as the doer o f ac tions i s  the  v ir tu e  of prudence.
Art i s  th e  h ab it d isposing  th e  human in t e l l e c t  by
which ex te rn a l a c tio n s  produce a due end through determ ined
means* I t  i s  concerned w ith products which are  d is t in c t
(17)
from th e  agent who makes them. As c o n tr ib u tin g  to  the 
p e rfe c tio n  of th e  whole man in  r e la t io n  to  the  t o t a l i t y  o f 
being , a r t  i s  an im prin ting  of the  p e rso n a lity  o f the a r t i s t
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not only on the m asterpiece o f h is  own l i f e ,  b u t on th e  can­
vas of th e  world. I t  i s  the  sharing  of the  dependent c rea­
tu re  in  th e  c rea tiv e  a c t iv i ty  o f th e  f i r s t  cause, w ith a l l  
th e  l im ita tio n s  proper to  th e  c re a tu re . I t s  tru e  sphere
i s  th e  discovery o f means to  a t t a in  i t s  own end and i t  p ro-
(18)
duces th e  th in g s  necessary  fo r  man's p e rfe c tio n . In  e i th e r  
the f in e  o r  th e  u se fu l a r t s ,  th e  a r t i s t  does not possess 
th e  h a b it of a r t  i f  he f a i l s  in  h is  o rd in a tio n  of meansto 
an end.
A ll th e  ac tio n s  which are performed by th e  agent as  an 
a r t i s t  are human a c ts .  Art has i t s  so c ia l and i t s  in d iv id u a l 
v a lu es . But a r t  has noth ing  to  do w ith making a man good, 
fo r  man i s  t r u ly  good only when h is  goodness i s  in te g ra te d  
w ith a l l  h is  thoughts and a c tio n s , th a t  i s ,  he i s  t ru ly  good 
only when he i s  m orally  good. The term m orally  good means 
simply th a t  he uses the proper means to  a t t a in  a good end 
p roperly  and in  keeping w ith  r ig h t  reason . I t  i s  because 
th e  u ltim a te  end o f man and th e  end to  which a l l  o th e rs  
are  subordinated i s  the l a s t  p e rfec tio n  o f  man, th e  know­
ledge and love of the cause o f a l l  being , th a t  m o ra lity , 
in  i t s  la rg e s t  sense i s  always concerned w ith  the  r e la t io n ­
sh ip  o f man to  h is  f i r s t  c a u se . M orality  i s  th e  domain of 
reason . And reason i s  d ire c te d  in  th e  attainm ent o f moral 
p e rfec tio n  by th e  v ir tu e  o f prudence.  The purpose of 
education i s  the  p e rfe c tio n  of the su b je c t,  man, and th a t
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p e rfe c tio n  must be the  moral p e rfe c tio n . I t  i s  tru e  th a t  
p e rfec tio n  l i e s  p rim arily  in  contem plation, bu t i t  i s  ex­
pressed and liv ed  a lso  in  a c tio n , in  th e  ex erc ise  o f v i r ­
tu e s  in  th e  ex te rn a l w orld. The ex erc ise  of moral v ir tu e s  
depends on the possession  o f the  in te l l e c tu a l  h ab it o r 
v ir tu e  o f prudence. There can be no moral v ir tu e s  w ith­
out prudence, and no prudence w ithout moral v i r tu e s .  The 
exp lanation  of t h i s  d o c trin e  i s  th e  exp lanation  of th e  sub­
je c tiv e  development o f man. Man always a c ts  fo r  an end, 
and th e  conception o f  th e  end i s  the  beginning o f moral ac­
t io n .  Prudence as the r e c ta  r a t io  ag ib ilium  d ir e c ts  th i s  
a c tio n . The r e la t io n  of prudence to  good l iv in g  i s  the 
nexus between the  su b jec tiv e  development of man fo r  le a rn ­
in g , and the same development in  l iv in g  the good l i f e .  Pru­
dence i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  moral v i r tu e s ,  and as an in te l l e c tu a l  
v ir tu e  proceeding from f i r s t  p r in c ip le s ,  i s  im possible w ith­
out th e  v ir tu e  o f understand ing . T h e o re tic a lly , th e  o ther 
four I n te l le c tu a l  V irtues may be had by one who f a i l s  to  
look upon the  tru e  goal o f education , bu t fo r  the a t t a in ­
ment o f the  proper goal of education , prudence i s  an abso lu te  
n e c e ss ity . M etaphysics, f i r s t  philosophy, i s  a rc h ite c to n ic  
in  th e  sp ecu la tiv e  o rd er; prudence i s  a rc h ite c to n ic  in  the  
p ra c t ic a l  o rd er, and must be the v ir tu e  s tre s se d  in  the 
p ra c t ic a l  o rder by th e  philosopher o f education .
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P a rt Two: The Moral V irtues
In  th e  system of Aquinas th e  sub jec t of education must 
be prepared fo r  l iv in g ,  and so the  I n te l le c tu a l  V irtues are  
n o t enough, because as we saw in  th e  l a s t  sec tio n  of th i s  
paper th e  w ill  has th e  fo rce  o f an e f f ic ie n t  cause in  r e la ­
t io n  to  human a c ts .  We m ust, th e re fo re , spend a b r ie f  tim e 
in  considering th e  v ir tu e s  which dispose th e  w i l l  to  p roper, 
easy and e ff ic a c io u s  ac tio n . I t  i s  tru e  th a t  reason i s  the
f i r s t  p r in c ip le  o f human ac tio n  p re c ise ly  as human, but the
(19)
command of th e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  not ty ra n n ic a l ,  i t  i s  p o l i t i c a l .  
R ebellion  i s  always p o ssib le  and th a t  i s  why th e  a p p e tite  
(w ill)  o f man needs h a b i ts ,  v i r tu e s ,  by which i t  i s  sub­
je c te d  to  the demands of reason . The o r ie n ta tio n  o f an 
educated man to  the proper goals  i s  th e  work o f the Moral 
V ir tu e s , A man may know th a t  the Moral V irtues must not 
exceed th e  mean o r ru le  o f  feason , but i t  i s  not always 
easy to  determine th e  boundary l in e  o f excess or d e fe c t.
This i s  th e  work of th e  eounsel, judgment and precept o f  
prudence. Balance and sa n ity  a re  given to  l i f e  by a c ts  
of counselt remembrance of th e  p a s t ,  understanding of the 
p re se n t, shrewdness in  grasping fu tu re  e v en ts , comparing 
the d a ta  thus ob ta ined , and d o c i l i ty  to  th e  opinion of 
o th e rs . When th i s  process has been completed, reason makes 
the f in a l  judgment on th e  s u i t a b i l i ty  o f the  d e f in ite  s e r ie s
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of means which are  chosen by the  w i l l .  The f in a l  and p r in c i­
pa l ac t o f prudence i s  an a c t o f command. Prudence i s  a r e ­
quirement fo r  le a rn in g  and a n e c e ss ity  fo r  l iv in g ,  and th e  
Moral V irtues are  the necessary  complement of prudence. The 
balance o f a harmonious l i f e ,  the subordination  of th e  sense 
l i f e  to  the reason, and of th e  reason to  th e  f i r s t  cause i s  
e ffec te d  by th e  Moral V irtu es  w ith prudence as the le v e r .
We w ill  l im it  ou rselves here to  th e  ro o t v i r tu e s ,  the
v ir tu e s  to  which a l l  the o th e rs  can be reduced. S t .  Thomas
s ta te s  th a t  the I n te l le c tu a l  V irtues are incom plete, because
they  only p e rfe c t one fa c u lty  in  mans the  Moral V irtues are
( 20)
in te re s te d  in  making the whole man good. And education fo r  
l iv in g  c o n s is ts  in  conforming th e  whole man to  th e  o rder of 
reason . This o rdering  can e x is t  in  th e  reason i t s e l f ,  in  
th e  v ir tu e  of prudence; o r i t  can be imposed on a c tio n s , the  
v ir tu e  o f ju s t ic e ;  or i t  re g u la te s  the passions, the  v ir tu e s  
of temperance and f o r t i tu d e .  In  s h o r t, th e re  i s  a four­
fo ld  sub jec t f o t  the  Moral V irtu e s; reason i s  m odified by 
prudence, the w ill  by ju s t i c e ,  th e  concup isc ib le  a p p e tite  
by temperance and th e  i r a s c ib le  ap p e tite  by fo r i tu d e .  The 
whole man i s  in te g ra te d  by p e rfe c tin g  th e  sources of human 
a c ts ,  and p e rso n a il i ty  i s  in te g ra te d  in  p roportion  as the  
educated person grows in  a l l  the  v i r tu e s .  D is in teg ra tio n  
i s  caused by th e  f re e  p lay  of th e  a p p e tite s  and i s  a con-
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f l i c t  w ith  the  fundamental order of the  ra t io n a l a p p e ti te .
I t  i s  a t  th is  po in t th a t  we reach a conclusion in  
our p h ilo so p h ica l t ru th s  th a t  are o f importance in  the 
realm o f education . C e rta in ly  th e re  a re  more t ru th s  t r e a ­
ted  by Aquinas, and t ru th s  which are necessary  fo r  the  pro­
per education of man. But th ey  a re  t ru th s  of th e  super­
n a tu ra l l i f e ,  and have no t t h e i r  proper p lace in  a p h ilo ­
sophy of education which l im its  i t s e l f  to  the t ru th s  known 
by reason and does not t r e a t  o f revealed  t r u th .  Aquinas, 
in  h is  philosophy of education  says th a t  th e  a c tio n  o f man 
must be crowned w ith the  in fu sed  Moral and Theological V ir­
tu e s ,  but th i s  m atte r i s  not w ith in  th e  competence of th e  
philosopher*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
P.9$
Conclusion
I  w il l  make a b r ie f  r e c a p itu la tio n  in  o rder th a t  we 
may view the e n t i r e  s tru c tu re  o f in te g ra tio n  th a t  Aquinas 
s e ts  fo r th  in  h is  philosophy o f Education.
I  The O b je c tiv ity  o f r e a l i t y ,  and the p o s s ib i l i ty  
o f mind a tta in in g  t h i s  o b jec tiv e  r e a l i t y .
I I  The t r u th  th a t  le a rn in g , in  r e la t io n  to  th e  in ­
t e l l e c t ,  viewed in  i t s  th e o re t ic  fu n c tio n  demands 
the  presence of knowledge, understanding and wis­
dom. And in  the  p ra c t ic a l  workingsof th e  i n t e l l e c t  
i t  demands the  h a b its  o f a r t  and prudence.
I l l  Education fo r  l iv in g  p o s tu la te s  prudence in  th e  re a ­
son and ju s t ic e  p e rfe c tin g  the  w i l l .
IV The concupiscib le  and i r a s c ib le  a p p e tite s  need the  
p e rfe c tio n  of temperance and f o r t i tu d e .
This philosophy o f education d ea ls  w ith fundam entals.
I t  i n s i s t s  th a t  t r u th  can only be had by th e  c o n s ta n t, per­
s is te n t  la b o r o f th e  human mind making an o b jec tiv e  t r e k  in to  
the  world of r e a l i ty .  Only then can the i n t e l l e c t  hope to  
p en e tra te  in to  th e  h ea rt o f th in g s  th a t  are  proposed to  i t ,  
acqu ire  an accu ra te  judgment about c re a tu re s  and avoid making 
the  common m istakes about th e  end of l i f e  by syn thesiz ing  
everyth ing  in  the  l ig h t  o f  th e  u n iv e rsa l cause . This i s  th e  
foundation of s o lid  philosophy and must be tak en  by the 
philosopher o f education  as th e  b a s is  in  a l l  h is  work.
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Notes on Chapter IV
(1) Aauinas. de V e r i ta te , Q .1 , a .1
(2) Aquinas, De M agistro , a r t .  1
(3) Summa Theologies, l a . Q.4, a . l
(4) Summa T heologies, l a , I l a e ,  Q.49, a ,4 •
(5) Summa fh eo lo g ica , l a , I l a e ,  Q.57, a .60 .
(6) Aauinas, de V e r ita te , Q.20, a .2 .
(7) Summa Theologies, l a , I l a e ,  Q.52, e t  Q. 53
(8) Summa Theologica, l a , I l a e ,  Q.57, a .1 .
(9) Locus C i t , a a ,2 ,3 ,4*
(10) Locus C it .  a . 2 .
(11) Op. C it .  Q .51J4.1
(12) Summa T heologies, l a , Q.79, a . 8.
(13) Summa Theologica, l a , I l a e ,  Q.57, a . 2 .
(14) Summa Theologica, l a . I l a e ,  Q.52, a .2 ,
(15) Summa Theologica, l a , I l a e ,  Q.3, a .3 .
(16) Summa T heolog ies. I a , I l a e ,  Q.57, a . l ,  as l j  a a .3 ,4
(17) Locus C it .  a . 5 ad 3 .
(18) ib id ,  ad. 1
(19) Summa Theologica.Q .81 , a .3 ,  ad 2 .
(20) Summa Theologies, I a , I la e ,  Q.61, a . l .
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